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T.R.B. *from Washington*

The Puritan Ethic

★ My mother took me back to her 70th reunion at Smith College some time ago. She was the only member of the Class of '91 who made it, but there were some youngsters back on their 65th, and the college put us all up in the Infirmary, and we got to bed at 9, and had a jolly time.

I am reminded of this by all the current talk about the "Puritan Ethic," an abstraction to many, but a concrete exemplification in my mother. Every six months she gets considerable satisfaction in snipping the coupons from the half dozen Treasury bonds she owns, but she is very much opposed to government deficits and IOU's. She thinks the government ought to *pay off* its debt; darling Mr. Eisenhower wanted that, didn't he?

Where would her bonds be if the government got out of debt? – the Puritan Ethic is a little vague here, and I leave the problem to Walter Heller and Douglas Dillon.

The Puritan Ethic seems to be slowly crumbling and I find it curiously poignant. Of all states, it is my mother's granite New Hampshire which now proposes to establish a state-run racetrack lottery, similar to the Irish sweepstakes, with tickets sold twice a year at the 50 state-operated liquor stores.

Dear me! My mother's father sat in that legislature, back in the 1840's, when it must have been as hard to keep out of the farmers' folkmoot as now, when the lower house has a membership of 400 (35 less than the House of Representatives) in a state of 600,000 people. If New Hampshire starts a lottery I suspect all of New England will follow. There will be a terrible racking of Yankee conscience which (although I deplore state lotteries as ignoble) will be worth watching.

The Puritan Ethic has its admirable side. It has always been hell-bent on education; it produced that noble creature the New England schoolmarm and also the New England conscience. The latter is a flaming but rather uncertain instrument; it believed in Prohibition (with hard cider in the cellar); it pitied the Heathen, and ran the 3-way lumber-rum-slave trade. We see it again now in reports from New Hampshire: the proceeds of the proposed lottery will go to pay school bills.

The Yankees have been diluted by French and Irish Catholics for a long time, with considerable effect on the Puritan Ethic. And now the Catholics, too, have their own problem.

A Catholic President has just reversed a Protestant one, and has offered to help other nations with birth control, if they desire. A Catholic doctor, John Rock of Harvard, has co-authored the book, *Voluntary Parenthood*, to the not very severe censure of his bishop, Cardinal Cushing of Boston. The Ford Foundation has allocated $3 million for birth control studies and the National Academy of Sciences has just called for joint international investigation of "uncontrolled population growth." Furthermore, members of Congress are fed up with appropriating billions in aid to impoverished countries who turn the money into more hungry babies.

Commentator Howard K. Smith dug up the fact the other day that seven states now give birth control information and materials to mothers on relief, and that some 40 American cities now give it freely to the poor. Anybody who can do the multiplication table knows that this issue must be met; it is here that the Catholic Ethic faces one of the most gruelling adjustments between its principles and the facts of life.

Rocky Road

★ Who is Martin Epstein? He is the ex-chairman of the NY State Liquor Authority, incommunicado now in Florida, ousted when he refused to waive immunity in the inquiry into corruption over state liquor licenses. Who named him to his $25,000 post? Governor Rockefeller, of course.

Who is Melvin Osterman? He is the $25,000-a-year judge of the NY Court of Claims. He won't resign and he won't waive immunity in the broadening liquor scandal. Who appointed him? Governor Rockefeller.

Who is Judson Morhouse? He is the ex-chairman of the NY GOP, twice manager of successful Rockefeller campaigns. He has quit all political posts after refusing to waive immunity over his law firm's handling of political liquor license applications.

The governor has acted promptly to fire tongue-tied appointees, but they reflect on his executive judgment; an added political problem is his putative remarriage. If the GOP thinks Rockefeller can't carry NY in '64, it's hard to believe they wouldn't drop him.

Wonder in Europe

★ *St. Louis Post Dispatch* reporter Thomas Ottenad has just come back from interviewing bankers, statesmen, industrialists in Paris, Rome, Bonn, Stockholm and London with one of the best economic series we have read in a long time. One and all they demanded to know why America is so fearful of a deficit; why does it take so long to institute a minor tax cut? He found the differences in thinking "startling" in three respects: European governments are vastly more flexible in financial policies; Europeans do not share America's horror of deficit spending; Europeans take for granted governmental supervision of the economy.

It will be a pity if Ottenad's articles are not republished. Here is his quotation from a report of the executive branch of the 6-nation Common Market: "An economic order based on freedom can only exist in the world today at the price of constant state intervention in economic life." How did Europeans react to President Kennedy's tax program? – "The only reservation among Europeans was fear that the Administration's program was not strong enough. . . ."

In this connection, an AP correspondent quietly noted last week that "the ruling Conservative Party [in England] has unveiled a budget that calls for a bigger spending increase, as big a tax cut, and a bigger deficit, then President Kennedy's."

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A Sponsor for Quality

The departure soon of Newton Minow from the Federal Communications Commission to the *Encyclopedia Britannica* should occasion an up-to-date re-examination of broadcasting. Mr. Minow has been a lively and good-tempered Chairman of the FCC. Because of him, things are not quite as unbearable as they were two years ago, when the new Chairman labeled TV "the vast wasteland" and said it was "a procession of game shows, violence, audience participation, formula comedies about totally unbelievable families, blood and thunder, mayhem, violence, sadism, murder, Western badmen, Western goodmen, private eyes, gangsters, more violence, and cartoons. And, endlessly, commercials – many screaming, cajoling and offending. And most of all, boredom." It was not enough, he told the broadcasters, "to cater to the nation's whims – you must also serve the nation's needs. . . . I intend to see that your debt is paid with service."

The debt remains unpaid. The wasteland, apart from an oasis or two, remains unfertile. Yet Mr. Minow is said to believe that he has done about all he can do. He has, of course, labored under handicaps. Four of the seven FCC Commissioners are carry-overs from the Eisenhower Administration; it was thought to be a triumph several weeks ago, when Mr. Minow rallied a majority of the Commission behind a tentative proposal to curtail the length and frequency of commercials in any given period of time – a proposal so mild it is already embodied in the voluntary code of the broadcasters themselves. Then, too, the industry has not taken kindly to Mr. Minow's progressively milder and always good-humored preachments of self-improvement. For from the industry's point of view, how could one much improve on profits of $82,206,000, which the networks made in 1961 – the last year for which figures are available?

In what was probably his farewell address to the National Association of Broadcasters, Mr. Minow late last month combined some earnest pleading with some hopeful prophecies. He noted that under his Chairmanship the FCC has reserved 56 additional channels for educational use; that 23 more ETV stations are now on the air than when he took office, bringing the total of today's operating ETV stations to 77. He reported with pride that in the last two years also, "14 licenses were revoked or denied a renewal; 15 more are now in the hearing process on the questions of revocation or renewal; 26 licenses were granted on a short-term basis." *That* had never been done before: henceforth the holder of a public franchise (a broad-

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COMING: *Murray Kempton on the postman who tried, but never made it to Mississippi*

casting license) cannot be sure of holding his franchise forever. But against that figure of 14 licenses revoked, one must place the figure of 3,823 authorized AM, 1,092 FM, and 751 TV stations.

The chairman recalled that Congress in 1962 adopted legislation under which new television sets will be equipped to receive many more channels than at present: "By lighting up 82 channels instead of just 12, the country has a chance for a truly nationwide educational television system, with stations offering classroom instruction by day and broad cultural programming in the evening." These new channels will make possible, he said, "a nationwide system of pay television if the public is willing to support this alternative to an advertiser-supported system; a new commercial network attempting to provide more diversity for the public; [and] new stations to meet local needs in many communities without local service." These new dimensions of TV, he believes, "will broaden the range of choice, will upgrade instead of degrade, will inspire instead of stultify, will liberate instead of suffocate."

Chairman Minow does not tell us whom he is counting on to consistently sponsor diversity that is not degrading; or rather his explanation is unconvincing, for it boils down to his faith that our "competitive enterprise system" will provide the answers. Why, one wonders, has it not done so before this?

The networks, of course, agree, for reasons less high-minded than Mr. Minow's. For them "freedom of the air" means their freedom to be let alone (let alone by government, not by advertisers). But what of the listeners and watchers? What of *their* freedom from the dictatorship of the dollar? It is as unfair to ask the networks and owners of stations to disregard profits as it is to ask a terrier not to bark; therefore, let us not complain if commercial broadcasting is guided by nothing nobler than program ratings, with an occasional bone thrown to "public service." But must we stop there? Could not the community sponsor the kind of sustained quality programming that is in *its* interest?

From industry propaganda, one might think that broadcasting is like any other enterprise. It is not. It is more comparable to public education in the breadth of its coverage, in its impact on taste and style than it is comparable, say, to steel production. Moreover, there are rigid limits on how competitive privately-financed television can be. The number of channels are limited by nature; the number of individuals with the will and means to succeed in the broadcasting business is likewise limited. Channel 13 in New York, an educational TV station singled out for praise by Mr. Minow, is at this moment in bad financial trouble. The five or so educational TV stations which do more than broadcast academic lessons are today subsidized, some precariously, by foundation and university grants, plus occasional contributions from listeners. To become the nucleus of a "truly nationwide educational television system" offering programs of interest to an adult evening audience – programs of fine entertainment as well as instruction – there would have to be new, large-scale financing. This is not a burden private philanthropy can or should be expected to shoulder. And if this nationwide system that informs and entertains us all during prime listening hours must await annual Congressional appropriations, we must prepare ourselves to do without it for many years. If we are lucky, this Congress just might appropriate $32 million for educational television, to be spread over four years and to be matched by an equal amount from other sources. One statistic will do: the networks spend in one week what all educational television spends in one year.

Would a fourth commercial network provide "more diversity?" Not much, and for the same reason: it would be driven by the law of its being to compete with existing networks for the same audience – the largest audience, the most popularity, thus assuring the most lucrative advertising.

What other option is there? There is the option of a Public Service Network, authorized by Congress, subsidized by all owners of TV and radio sets and managed by a quasi-public authority. The BBC is not without blemish, but it has proved the possibility of independent, non-commercial national television. BBC's governors are appointed by the Prime Minister for varying terms in office. The government can counsel the BBC but not direct it. Its domestic operating costs are underwritten by a yearly license on each set (£4 for a TV set, £1 for radio). Within the national network, there are flourishing regional services. Where meritorious programs originating from one region have wider potential appeal, they are picked up and broadcast nationally.

We can invent our own forms, consistent with our federal structure, our distaste for bureaucratic control, and reflecting the variety and size of this country.

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But it is suggestive to reflect on what revenues would be available to a Public Service Network, financed on the British pattern: last year there were 183.8 million radio and 60.2 million TV sets in use in the US; in 1962, 18,976,000 new radio and 6,301,000 TV sets were bought, excluding purchases of foreign made sets.

If there is to be a Public Service Network devoted exclusively to "the public interest, convenience and necessity," however, its establishment would have to be preceded by a clamorous consumer demand – not for more of the same but for something altogether different, a non-commercial yardstick by which to measure the programming of private broadcasting. It is not "elitist" to believe that the community has interests and values which cannot be entrusted to competitive enterprise alone. The public supports a variety of things – schools, museums, parks – which do not "pay their way" but which express the community's commitment to the worthwhile and the enjoyable. A Public Service Network would welcome Howard K. Smith, who is about to be dropped by commercial television. It would be a forum for the imaginative, a means of giving life to broadcasting that is, in Mr. Minow's words, "unafraid of controversy" and that breaks through "the crusty rigidity and stubborn complacency of the *status quo*."

Debate Over Cuba

Underneath all the rhetoric about Cuba, it is apparent that the Administration does not know anything very promising to do about the problem. It will keep close watch. It will let the CIA play a game or two, here and there, such as continuing the fight-for-freedom broadcasts from Swan Island off the coast of Honduras. It will try to turn the economic screws a little tighter – admittedly a symbolic gesture little likely to sink the Cuban economy so long as the Russians are willing to keep it afloat. It will try to shore up vulnerable governments in the environs. It will, as the President said on April 24, work with the OAS to "limit the movement of potential guerrillas in and out of Cuba." Beyond that, it hopes something will turn up to weaken the clasp between Havana and Moscow. It will all take time; how much, no one can foresee, and there is no formula for sure success.

The Administration's critics have little else to offer. Senator Keating's position is not now markedly different from that of the White House; he admits it is "foolish for anyone to pretend that there are easy answers to the Cuban situation; there are not now; there never were." Richard Nixon and Governor Rockefeller offer a sterner tone – high in pitch but low in content; in the end it amounts to an inference that although little more can be done, they could do it better than Kennedy. Even Senator Goldwater is not quite prepared to bite the bullet. No one to speak of is forthrightly for war on Castro. No one suggests ways of coming to terms with him. No one proposes that Cuban exiles take over the foreign policy of the United States. That's the sum of a week of strenuous debate touched off by José Miro Cardona's farewell philippic.

With regard to its critics, the Administration is in a position like that of a proverbial Lisbon peddler who, on being hauled into court on a charge of purveying pills to cure earthquakes, asked the judge: "What do you have to put in their place?"

Disunited States

In a daft moment late last December, a bare majority of the Assembly of States of the usually-responsible Council of State Governments voted to launch a campaign to break up the federal union. The Assembly endorsed three proposed amendments to the federal Constitution, the first of which would permit two-thirds of the state legislatures, acting separately, to propose amendments to the federal Constitution directly to the states for ratification, thus bypassing both Congress and the national constitutional convention stipulated in the Constitution.

The second would forbid federal courts to intervene in the apportionment of seats in state legislatures.

The third, and most amazing, would create, by constitutional amendment, a "court of the union" composed of the chief justices of the 50 state Supreme Courts. A majority of the sitting members of this "court of the union" could on its own motion, intervene and overthrow any US Supreme Court decision considered an invasion of states' rights.

The backers of these amendments mean business. Identical texts, apparently disseminated from one source, are being adopted by state legislatures. If 34 legislatures should endorse any one of them, Congress would be confronted with the demand to call a national constitutional convention to consider submitting the proposal for ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures.

In other words legislators representing less than 11 percent of the population could propose amendments, and these amendments would become law if ratified by representatives of less than 15 percent of the population. This is so because of unequal apportionment. Minorities elect majorities in state legislatures. For example, 27 percent of the population of New Mexico elects a majority in one house and 14 percent of the population elects a majority in the other. The legislatures of two-thirds of the states are controlled by 11.7

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percent of the nation's population.

Today, only some five months after the amendments were originally put forward, 10 state legislatures, or nearly one-third of the needed 34, have endorsed the proposal to prevent the federal courts from intervening in apportionment of legislatures. Eight legislatures, or nearly one-fourth of those necessary, have in this short time endorsed the proposal that 34 legislatures acting independently and over a period of time, could compel the calling of a federal constitutional convention to act upon an amendment submitted by them. And four legislatures – Alabama, Arkansas, Florida and Wyoming – have endorsed the "court of the union."

No Squeeze on Profits

Almost overlooked in the steady stream of favorable business statistics is the Commerce Department's announcement that corporate profits before taxes reached a record annual rate of $54 billion in the fourth quarter of last year – some $2 billion above earlier estimates. For the year as a whole they stood at $51.5 billion, more than $4 billion above the previous high set in the robust recovery year of 1959.

These rising earnings have already been translated into firm expectations of a broad expansion of the American economy. Nothing loosens the corporate pursestrings as quickly as the prospect of making an extra buck. The efficacy of Lord Keynes' concept of the marginal efficiency of capital was amply demonstrated two weeks ago in McGraw-Hill's annual survey showing that corporate managers plan to pump a record $40 billion into new plants and equipment this year, up seven percent over 1962. The government had earlier estimated only a five percent rise. Chairman Walter Heller of the President's Council of Economic Advisers has repeatedly singled out strong capital outlays as the prime missing ingredient in the economy's disappointing performance since 1957.

Since the federal government takes 52 percent of corporate profits, the prospects for shaving fiscal 1964's anticipated $11.9 billion deficit are also bright. The euphoria of prospective prosperity might also dampen Congressional enthusiasm for a tax cut, though some government officials profess to see its chances enhanced, pointing out that a smaller federal deficit might overcome the economy bloc's timidity about slashing federal revenues.

The increase in earnings further indicates that the present business upturn may last a good many more months. In every previous postwar expansion, corporate profit margins have turned downward long before the peak in business activity has been reached.

Probably the most salutary effect of the news of high corporate profits is the promise of a timely end to the dreary iteration of a "profits squeeze" – if indeed there ever was one. This battered cliché has been used as a pretext to flagellate organized labor as greedy and irresponsible; to wring concessions from an Administration unfairly represented as anti-business; to cover up corporate inefficiency, slowness to innovate and, if you will, managerial featherbedding.

There is a tendency in the business community to regard the inflated profits of the great postwar sellers' market as "normal." In 1948, at 11.4 percent of net worth after taxes, these profits were at their highest point since at least World War I. But 1948 profits were probably grossly overstated as the result of comparatively small depreciation charges.

Conversely, extremely high depreciation allowances (which represent usable cash to corporations) in recent times have tended to understate profits. Prof. Theodore A. Anderson of the University of California questions the whole concept of a "profits squeeze" and points out that after-tax profit margins from 1956 through 1961 averaged 6.5 percent of net worth, the same figure that prevailed in the prosperous period 1926-1929. "While profit margins have declined since the immediate postwar years, it appears that this decline represented a return to normal," he concludes.

The Daughters

President Kennedy's greeting to last week's Congress of the Daughters of the American Revolution was an infinitely-gentled echo of President Roosevelt's scornful ironies and thus a proper acknowledgment of the claim which the endurance of the Daughters now entitles them to levy on our affection as antiquarians. There is no other American institution left with the pride to parody itself. Who but the Daughters could object to a Domestic Peace Corps on the grounds that it will "enlist young people to work at meager pay among the nation's needy . . ." and thus "delay the entrance of the nation's youth into the field of free enterprise." (Translate this into the language of Philadelphia of 1777: "Whereas the Continental Congress has assembled at Valley Forge a company of ragged transients, without wages, in housing which depresses community property values, the Daughters of Philadelphia do command that they go hence and no further delay their entrance into the mercantile system.")

But if the Daughters are severe on the great issues, they can be tolerant in the small things. A Daughter does not need an ancestor who bent the proud Cornwallis to his glance at Yorktown; she is eligible if she can find one who kept the town jail back home, or who sold the muskets that exploded in the faces of the

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Green Mountain boys, or even one who was a pastor "who preached patriotic sermons." And observe the standards for pages at National Congresses: "The girl must not be more than 35 years of age." If a woman of 35 wants to call herself a girl, the DAR understands.

The 2,000 delegates gathered on the third morning of their convention to vote their resolutions, affectingly serious and unanimous at the outset, except for a few protestants from Upstate New York – always a pest of Jacobinism – whose chapters had instructed them to abstain from voting on all resolutions, because they had not been submitted to the membership in advance. The President-General explained that "relative to abstinence that is your privilege," although of course it could not be recorded.

They moved to fiscal policy. "Only drastic reductions in foreign aid [would] insure economic growth and national solvency." Then it was time for the resolution to withdraw from the United Nations. The delegates were reminded that they had not formally left the UN since 1958. There was an unexpected muster at the microphone in the well of the house. Mrs. Foster Sturtevant of Connecticut, white-haired and full-rigged, moved that the resolution be tabled for a year. "Our society is already on record against the United Nations," she said. "Connecticut lost many members with that resolution. We are of the opinion that this resolution will add nothing and that Connecticut will lose many more members. I move that the resolution be laid over until 1964 so that time may be allowed to correct the inequities of the UN."

There was a pause of troubled silence before the terrible authority of customer resistance; have we arrived at that swamp where even the DAR thinks of its image?

But the President-General rallied to summon the parliamentarian. This was a massive, weathered geologic survival of a face; the face pronounced Mrs. Sturtevant of Connecticut out of order; and, having lost the argument of policy, the opposition had to fall back on the nobler but feebler argument of principle. Eleanor McDowell of Glens Falls, N. Y., said that the Daughters must reaffirm their faith in the UN as "an imperfect but valid instrument of peace." A lady from Fargo, N. D., supported her; but then up stood a lady from Florida to say that the UN has already seized 21 counties in South Carolina. Ann Gilbert of the District of Columbia closed the ranks: "Every day we delay this resolution we are giving the Communists a chance to go deeper into our national security."

They delayed no more. Perhaps 100 dissenters were observed on the standing vote. There was no disturbance on succeeding resolutions, beyond the faintest rustle of no's.

Murray Kempton

Will You Join the Dance?

The times being as they are, the least excuse to giggle should be hailed with delight. Pursuant to this theory it seems worth while to call attention to a leaflet bearing the title (printed in red ink) "Nelson Rockefeller, the International Socialist." It emanates from New Orleans, appropriately, no doubt, since Louisiana has long been the locale of the fabulous – as, for instance, presumed Catholics who defy their archbishop rather than acknowledge the brotherhood of man, and presumed Protestants who, at Mer Rouge, eliminated nonconformists by running over them with a tractor.

Yet even in that environment it is a little startling to find Senator Barry Goldwater attainted by association with the Socialist Rockefeller. But the leaflet, after naming Goldwater, draws the doleful inference that "no meaningful opposition to Rockefeller can be expected from within the ranks of the Republican Party."

The dreadfulness of this situation is explained by a quotation from something called The Dan Smoot Report that, "The Council on Foreign Relations is the invisible government of the United States." The Council, an organization for the study of foreign relations, is unofficial, but its insidious nature is proved by the fact that its membership, to say nothing of outcast Democrats, includes Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allen W. Dulles, Henry Cabot Lodge, General Maxwell D. Taylor, and did include the late John Foster Dulles. The only adequate comment would seem to be that of Editor Theodore Dwight on the election of Thomas Jefferson: "Can the imagination paint anything more dreadful on this side of hell?"

In the judgment of the authors of this leaflet every American possessed of a brain that slightly outweighs a peanut is, if not a card-carrying Communist, at least a fellow-traveler, and the one dimly flickering hope is that somehow the country may yet be taken over by the completely brainless. But that hope is faint indeed, seeing that if intelligence would sell the country, imbecility would give it to its enemies. In such circumstances, why not cooperate with the inevitable? Why not proceed gaily down the primrose path, since melancholy marches to the identical doom?

No matter if the object of the Cajuns from New Orleans is to raise gooseflesh. If they have raised a laugh, we are indebted to them; and we may well respond by adapting the lilting measures of some vaudeville comedian of the past generation, answering their lamentation with an invitation:

We're off to the madhouse over the hills
To laugh and play with the daffy-dills;
Don't you want to come along?

Gerald W. Johnson

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FOREIGN REPORTS

LAOS

"A Very Fragile Structure"

★ A neutral Laos was a hundred to one shot, depending as it did on China's acquiescence to continuing and increased Western intrusion in Southeast Asia. The bit-by-bit reassertion of hegemony over the entire Peninsula is part of a major design to correct the humiliations that history has heaped upon China, and if she tarries, it is only because of more pressing internal matters or more urgent international pursuits, *i.e.*, the Indian frontier. The undermining of Laotian neutralism (described by President Kennedy as "a very fragile structure"), is made easier by the fact that most of the Laotians who care very much about which way the battle goes seem relatively well disposed to the Communists. Thus, the Pathet Lao victories on the Plaine des Jarres and the apparent disintegration of the Neutralists seemed only a matter of time.

If Assistant Secretary of State Harriman is unable to persuade the Russians to put the West's cause in strong language to the Chinese (and one can understand their hesitancy at a time when their own relations with the Chinese are under considerable strain), then there are two major options available to the US: (1) Get out; (2) Agree to a partitioned Laos, with the Royalists and whatever Neutralists could be persuaded to join, in control of the western section of the country – the part abutting Thailand. US troops in Thailand could conveniently support it; they might even, upon request, help police it for a time. To the Communists would be ceded the eastern strip, which they already control and which adjoins Vietnam and includes the Ho Chi Minh trail, the supply line for Communist infiltration into South Vietnam.



The US then would be committed to supporting a predominantly Royalist government in a split Laos. Whether that government would prove more stable than the present tri-partite "neutral" government is doubtful. The Pathet Lao and the Viet Minh would be able to infiltrate at will. When it comes to a fight, the Royalist troops will do what they have done before, run away. That leaves the US Marines and Rangers. The Neutralists are so split amongst themselves that no firm resistance can be expected from them. There would be in "Western" Laos the same special "civic missions" and counter-insurgency forces at work, telling the people what their "independence" means in hopes that they will defend it – and perhaps finally uprooting them from their villages into defense compounds – in short, the whole dreary business which Jerry Rose describes at length in this issue of *The New Republic*.

The groundwork for defense of Laos will be laid this month when 24,000 troops, including 3,000 Americans, arrive in Thailand for SEATO maneuvers. These will be staged in the northern and eastern parts of the country, in other words, those parts where Communist activity has been the most intense, and along the Mekong River, which forms the boundary between Thailand and Laos, in close proximity for action should it become necessary to defend the Royalist territories.

JAPAN

Defeat of the Socialists

★ If the Socialist Party is to make good on its promise to win control of Japan by the end of the decade, it will need to put on a considerably stronger performance than it did in recent local elections. In these, Liberal-Democratic Party candidates for governor easily won in all but three of 20 prefectures, thus brightening the hopes of Mr. Ikeda, the Prime Minister, for next year's general elections and reinforcing the view that the Socialists are for the time being politically moribund.

Liberal-Democrats won their most significant victory

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in Tokyo. There, 10 million people dwell cheek by jowl, many of them in unusual squalor, and thereby affording Mr. Sakamoto, the Socialist candidate, a variety of appeals with which to unite the poor and the young who vote Socialist in large numbers. He was unsuccessful. Dr. Ronald Azuma, the incumbent Liberal-Democrat governor of Tokyo increased his prior margin of victory and won by over 600,000 of the four million votes. The Olympic games to be held in Tokyo next year partly explain Dr. Azuma's popularity. "Doctor Azuma minus Sports equals zero," was Sakamoto's campaign cry, but to little effect. Actually the Olympics have provided Tokyo with an opportunity to do some rebuilding, but the needs are so immense that even the $12.5 billion budgeted by Azuma for renewal during this decade may not suffice.

The lack of water is one of the more urgent of many problems: about one and a half million people receive no water except in rare emergencies. Sewage disposal is another: less than a quarter of all homes are connected to the city sewers. Traffic is hopelessly tangled; 60,000 people in Tokyo alone are killed or injured in traffic accidents each year. More than 470,000 more housing units are needed; the three million unemployed or marginally employed people in the city are a constant drain on relief funds, and unemployment steadily rises with immigration from the countryside.

ARAB UNION

Can It Work?

★ Critics of the Arab federal union announced in Cairo on April 17 may be tempted to overlook its historic importance. They will say that it is a vehicle for the extension of President Nasser's personal power; that its declared object is the destruction of Israel; that it represents a futile papering over of the fierce feuds that traditionally divide the Arab states; that it will oppress minorities, offend deep-rooted particularist sympathies in each of the three member states and pose insuperable problems of administration; that it is a flimsy structure built on a history of suspicion and failure; that it will not work. Some of these fears may prove justified, but they should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the 30-page document issued after the Cairo talks represents the most ambitious attempt at statecraft in the Arab world in recent history.

The document is a sketch of a constitution for a proposed federation of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. This constitution is to be drafted in full within the next five months and approved by plebiscite not later than September 16. There will follow a transition period of 20 months in which the institutional machinery provided by the constitution will be set up at the federal and regional levels. If all goes well, the new-style United Arab Republic should emerge as a full-fledged constitutional state, all its checks and balances smoothly working by May, 1965.

The importance of the Cairo agreement lies first in the fact that for the first time in 20 years Egypt and Iraq – the two great rival centers of pan-Arabism – are no longer engaged in staking conflicting claims to leadership and hegemony in the Arab world in the name of Arab unity. Syria, the traditional victim of their ancient tug-of-war, may now breathe more easily, and the Arab public may gain some respite from the flood of lies and abuse with which rival radio stations have poisoned the Arab atmosphere in the last decade.

Likewise, the agreement is important because of the central place it gives to the creation of representative political institutions as a safeguard against arbitrary rule in the proposed federal state. Egypt, Syria and Iraq are at present ruled by *juntas* which seized power by conspiracy and retain it by force. Egypt has been stable for nearly ten years but this has been due more to President Nasser's dominant personality and to the efficiency of his security services than to the political structure of his state. Indeed, a consequence of his monopoly of political power is the lack of effective political institutions in Egypt which might ensure a smooth and peaceable succession should Nasser disappear. Syria and Iraq are also in need of new institutions because the political framework inherited from the inter-War Mandates has been destroyed by repeated upheavals and *coups d'etat* and by the rise of the new generation of radical pan-Arabs now in power.

To supply this need the draft constitution provides for the free election of a National Assembly which will be the highest authority of the Federal State. Modeled on the US Congress, it will comprise a House of Representatives (in which Egypt will have an automatic majority because of her greater population) and a Senate (in which all three states will be equally represented). At the head of the Federal State will be a President elected for a four-year term by the Assembly and enjoying wide powers. He will initiate legislation, appoint judges of the supreme court, army officers, senior federal officials and members of the federal cabinet who will be answerable to the Assembly. He will be assisted by three regional vice presidents. Each region will in turn have its assembly and regional cabinet of so far undefined powers.

So much then for the theory. But can it be made to work and how does it square with the facts of power in the Arab world?

The Cairo agreement represents, in effect, a fragile truce between President Nasser and the Ba'ath Party which rules Iraq and shares power in Syria with Nasser's supporters. Will this truce survive the 25 long

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months of transition before the proposed constitution comes into effect? Already, within days of the agreement, there are signs that each side intends using the interim period to consolidate its power and weaken its rival. The Ba'ath can clearly do nothing to disturb Nasser's monolythic hold on Egypt, but the subterranean struggle for the control of Syria and Iraq will continue – as it has these past few weeks.

There is little doubt that President Nasser will next September be elected unopposed as head of the new federal state. He will then share power for the remaining 20 months of the transition period with a presidential council representing, in effect, the existing ruling military and civilian authorities in Baghdad and Damascus. But his position will be rather stronger than that of *primus inter pares*. This will be the crucial period when his ultimate intentions and conceptions of statecraft will be made clear. Banking on his personal ascendency and unhampered by an elective assembly, will he be tempted to edge out his Ba'athist rivals, or to delay the introduction of the irksome parliamentary system which could in the long-run affect his own position in Egypt, or even to incite his followers in Jordan to strike at King Hussein?

DR. VERWOERD'S SCHEME FOR TRANSKEI MAY BOOMERANG

Experiment in Segregation

Capetown

The new Black state which South Africa is creating in the Transkei tribal reserve, in the Eastern Cape Province, is unique in Africa. It never asked to become a state and not in its wildest dreams could it imagine that one day the white government in Pretoria would voluntarily offer it self-rule and sovereign independence. In fact, there was no such thing as a Transkei political consciousness. The idea of the "separateness" of the Transkei from the rest of the country is entirely Dr. Verwoerd's.

This is odd, too. In the past decade of African emancipation from colonial rule, Dr. Verwoerd has had one insistent complaint: that the metropolitan powers have granted independence "prematurely." Now this selfsame Dr. Verwoerd proffers "independence" (the validity of the term is challenged, but more about that later) to tribesmen who cannot recall ever having raised the matter.

South African politics have a reputation for being slightly crazy, but this seems to be the craziest situation of all. How did it arise?

The colonization of South Africa by whites began in 1652. Today, 311 years later, there are 3 million whites, 11 million Africans, 1.5 million coloreds of mixed racial descent, and 450,000 Asians. They constitute an economically integrated society, with the non-whites contributing the overwhelming bulk of the labor force in the gold mines and on the white-owned farms, and a substantial majority of the labor force in industry and commerce. If the non-whites were to stop working, South Africa would stop working. The Africans and Asians, however, have no elected representatives in the white man's political institutions, while the coloreds have only four (white) representatives in an Assembly of 160 members.

Apartheid, in its essence, is a denial of *all* political rights to non-whites in the so-called "white areas" of South Africa. It admits this. Repeatedly, Dr. Verwoerd has warned that the refusal of political rights to non-whites in the "white areas" is a question of principle: that if a single concession is made then the white man is lost. On the other hand, Dr. Verwoerd admits that no nation or race can be denied political rights altogether. He says that the Afrikaner supporters of his government, who suffered under British imperialism for so long, know better than most people that each nation or race is entitled to its own sovereignty.

South African Parliamentary politics have raged over this issue: whether "separate territorial development" is feasible. Today, as the embryonic Transkei state takes shape – the first of the experiments – the storm rages even more furiously.

For the 11 million Africans, only 13 percent of the surface area of South Africa is allocated; this is the undeveloped part of South Africa, agriculturally backward and devoid of industries. For the 3 million whites, the wealth of South Africa is appropriated. The tribal areas could never become self-sufficient without massive injections of capital – and the present rate of government expenditure is minimal. Only 4 million of the 11 million Africans live in the reserves. The remaining 7 million work on white-owned farms and in the

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towns and cities. Most of the latter have no intention ever of returning to the reserves, and they are doomed therefore to spend their lives voteless and powerless, the hewers of wood in a foreign country. As for the 1.5 million colored and 450,000 Asians, they fit in nowhere. As non-whites, they are denied active participation in the white man's affairs, and yet there are no "homelands" for them. Dr. Verwoerd has not yet filled in this gap in his philosophy of South African politics.

The Transkei has been chosen as the site for the first experiment in tribal "self-rule" because it is the biggest tribal area, accommodating nearly 1.5 million Xhosa-speaking Africans; but probably more particularly because it is a single, compact territory, not broken up into fragments like some of the other proposed "Bantustans." How Verwoerd proposes to confer sovereignty on these dozens of little "black spots" in the "white areas" is a question the Parliamentary Opposition keeps asking, and Dr. Verwoerd keeps avoiding. Anyway, there stands the Transkei today, with its thatched-roofed, bee-hive shaped huts, its tribesmen plodding behind oxen-drawn ploughs in the fields, its red-blanketed women smoking long, wooden pipes – all waiting for self-rule. The prospective members of the "Legislative Assembly," which will be set up this year or next year, are the four Paramount Chiefs and the 60 other Chiefs, who constitute the tribal system which Dr. Verwoerd rescued from collapse.

At the head of the tribal pyramid in the Transkei is a lean, hard-jawed man, Chief Kaiser Matanzima. One would expect him to be like most of the other chiefs: semi-literate, unskilled in present-day politics, a little bewildered by the idea that he is soon going to be the "Chief Minister" of the Transkei. But this is an underestimation of Chief Kaiser. He has had some legal training, he is harsh and a trifle arrogant, and he has an antipathy toward white men which is usually encountered only among extreme pan-Africanists.

Chief Kaiser Mantanzima, in the past year or two, has become one of the central figures on the South African stage. To Dr. Verwoerd's officials, he is the "right kind" of African, who supports *apartheid;* to some of his own tribesmen, too, he is Dr. Verwoerd's "stooge" – and for this betrayal of African nationalism he is obliged to move around with a massive bodyguard; to most South Africans he is an enigma; and, finally, to certain observers he is a calculating politician who is going to take Dr. Verwoerd for the biggest ride of his life.

It must be remembered that many whites in South Africa, and nearly all politically-conscious non-whites, regard the whole "Bantustan" plan as bluff. They say Verwoerd has no intention of conferring real self-rule or real independence on the Transkei or on any other "Bantustan." As proof of this contention, they point to the meager sums spent on developing the tribal areas and to the equally meager powers now being conferred by the white Parliament on the Transkei.

The question of Dr. Verwoerd's intentions, however, almost becomes irrelevant; because, as the leader of the opposition, Sir de Villiers Graaf, has pointed out, having *promised* self-rule and independence, Dr. Verwoerd is no longer able to control either the timetable or the direction. In other words, Chief Kaiser Matanzima will bide his time, and then demand full self-rule and, perhaps, full independence, long before Dr. Verwoerd is ready to grant it. Dr. Verwoerd's Afrikaner supporters, who were reared on a policy of "keeping the African in his place," would have to give their verdict on this, and there are reasonable grounds for the suspicion that they would not tolerate it for a moment. Yet how could Dr. Verwoerd repudiate his own creation?

At the moment, Chief Kaiser Matanzima is making vigorous anti-white statements, in the sense that he is rejecting, with undisguised hostility, any idea of multi-racialism in the Transkei. Some African Nationalist leaders read his speeches with dismay because, as they see it, the desperate need in Africa is for unity and cooperation, not fragmentation and tribal disruptiveness. But neither does Dr. Verwoerd want multi-racialism in the Transkei, because under his *apartheid* policy it is a case of to each his own.

Meanwhile, the third force in the Transkei is obtruding itself: the terrorist organization, Poqo: the bitterly anti-white Africans who made the two assassination attempts on Chief Kaiser Mantanzima. It happens that many of Chief Kaiser Mantanzima's Tembu tribesmen work in Cape Town, 750 miles miles away, like so many other Transkei tribesmen, who are forced away from their huts by the impoverishment of the reserves. In Cape Town, rootless, voteless, and harried by the police, they have established the headquarters of Poqo – a Xhosa word meaning "We Stand Alone!" Poqo does not admit even other non-whites, like coloreds and Asians, to membership. Twice Poqo organized gangs to travel all the way to Chief Kaiser Mantanzima's "Great Place" in the Transkei to kill him, with pangas, spears, knives and stocks. Twice they failed. On the first occasion the police intercepted them on a hill and they fought a pitched battle in which six of their number died. On the second occasion, the police intercepted them as their train pulled into Queenstown station, and another seven died. Three members of these two Poqo gangs have already been sentenced to death: the first death sentences under the new laws passed last year. Others were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of up to 25 years. The police now are in the midst of a campaign to crush them.

STANLEY UYS

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Reading de Gaulle's Mind

by Raymond Aron

When General de Gaulle speaks of a united or harmonious Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, is this to be taken as straw in the wind, indicating a reversal of alliances to come? (It would still be necessary for Khrushchev to show some interest in such a reversal.) When de Gaulle hints privately at the evacuation of American troops from Europe, is he expressing his hopes or his fears? When he proclaims the need for a closely united Western Europe, self-sufficient in every respect, including defense, is he thinking of a Europe within the Atlantic framework or of a Europe holding both the giants at arms length?

It would be futile to expect an answer to these questions from the Gaullists or from the French minister of foreign affairs. The average Gaullist will tailor his reply to what he considers diplomatically expedient or to what he believes to be de Gaulle's current thinking; as a result his answers will be as categorical at any given moment as they have been variable in times gone by. As for the Minister, whatever his personal convictions, his answers must be appropriate to his function and to what is considered proper in relations among allies.

The truth, it seems to me, is that there can be no answer to these questions in the form in which they are usually posed, because strategic objectives are inevitably subject to change depending on shifting events, and also because General de Gaulle doesn't really want anyone to know the answers with any degree of certainty.

In the present situation, does de Gaulle desire the withdrawal of the American troops stationed between the East-West demarcation line and the French frontier – troops which, to the Soviet leaders, symbolize the American threat of atomic reprisal?

Obviously, de Gaulle has little love for the Atlantic Organization or for the idea of integrated armed forces. He is reducing French participation in NATO as much as his relations with Chancellor Adenauer permit. It does not bother him to have it said that the risk of war or aggression has diminished to such a point that, in the last analysis, Europe could get along without the protection of the United States. But whether and to what extent his views, both private and public, are based on real conviction or are adopted for tactical purposes, de Gaulle must realize that West Germany, an essential partner in the present phase of his strategy, places solidarity with the United States above all else.

What would become of West Berlin were President Kennedy to look upon the Europeans as rivals rather than as rather difficult allies? In spite of various objections pointed out to me, I maintain that the less General de Gaulle fears being deprived of American protection, the greater his show of indifference toward this protection; I further maintain that he is counting heavily on the other European nations to smooth the ruffled feathers of public opinion or of the American Congress. (An entirely different matter is the fact that France's European partners, intermittently seeing through the game, may sometimes be exasperated at this less than glorious role thus assigned them.)

If such a withdrawal of American troops is neither envisaged nor desired for the here and now, what of the future? During the past few weeks de Gaulle has said several times, and his official spokesmen have repeated the statement to journalists in search of prophetic views, that America's presence in Europe may well be "temporary"; that is, looking ahead to the '70's, one may envision the Old Continent having new strength and a nuclear striking force – the Russian government having ceased to be "tyrannical and conquest-hungry," and the GIs no longer standing guard over the boundaries of the Free World.

De Gaulle certainly does not dislike the notion of a world in which Europe, inspired by France, would be self-sufficient. But he is not alone in this; both grown-ups and children dream of Santa Claus. The problem lies elsewhere: does this picture of the '70's which I have outlined require that *both* conditions be fulfilled? Will the American soldiers depart even if Russia remains "tyrannical"? De Gaulle is not required to decide between the two alternatives. He has written that ". . . in the long run the Russians will lose all desire to overstep their boundaries." In Vladivostok the Russians extensively overstepped their boundaries but have not as yet given the slightest sign of any desire to pull back. It remains uncertain whether de Gaulle's "in the long run" is to be interpreted in terms of years, decades, or centuries. If the Russians do not withdraw behind their boundaries, will the Americans nevertheless "lose all desire" to remain in Europe?

General de Gaulle seems to doubt the Americans will defend Europe, and certain commentators are hinting that on this point the wish is father to the thought.

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This may be so, but the opposite theory might also be maintained, and de Gaulle himself might justifiably reply by quoting Spinoza: "In order to bring to this study of politics the same unprejudiced mind which one ordinarily brings to mathematical research, I have taken every care to not deride the acts of mankind, to not weep over them, to not detest them, but rather to gain a true understanding of them."

Does de Gaulle hope the Soviet Government will become less "tyrannical and conquest-hungry"? Of course he does, and so does every Frenchman. Does he wish the Americans would withdraw from Europe, even if the Soviets remain "tyrannical and conquest-hungry"? In my opinion he does not, though we cannot rule out some doubt on this point.

Is it probable that the Americans will withdraw? By the nature of things in the 20th Century, it is highly improbable.

Could Kennedy Budge the Congress?

by Alan Rosenthal

If Congress will not budge, the people should budge it. And who will move the people to budge the Congress? The President, of course.

This overworked cliché comes in several varieties. The most common calls for Kennedy to launch a sustained campaign to educate the public. If there is no spontaneous surge of emotion behind New Frontier programs, it is the Presidential task to remind the people that there *are* problems, convince the people that they *must* be solved, and thereby change the climate of national opinion. There are those who go further. They believe the President's *major* job is not dickering fruitlessly with a balky legislature but persuading the people through some systematic campaign, including press conferences, dedications, addresses to national organizations and televised "fireside chats." Kennedy's legislative strategy, according to this view, would be to go over the heads of Congressmen, appeal to the voters directly, and enlist their support in pressuring their representatives on Capitol Hill.

The case for bypassing Congress and going directly to the people often is based on false analogy to the methods of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. The New Freedom supposedly came about as a result of Wilson's everlasting appeals to the public. The fact is that Wilson achieved his program because of the way in which he established and asserted his leadership in Congress. In the House he had a resourceful lieutenant in Oscar Underwood, the Democratic floor leader, and a smoothly functioning party caucus. In the Senate there had been the astounding revolution of 1913, which overthrew, at least temporarily, the seniority system, brought Wilson men to key committee chairmanships, and made John Worth Kern, a devoted Presidential supporter, Majority Leader. Although Wilson made use of frequent informal appeals and statements to the press in order to build popular support for his party and program, the battles over specific legislation were fought exclusively in the Congressional arena. So firmly did the President control Congress from 1913 to 1917 that only upon one occasion, the struggle over military and naval expansion, did he appeal to the nation in the hopes of breaking down Congressional resistance.

Franklin Roosevelt's press conferences and especially his "fireside chats" allegedly made possible the New Deal. Did they? What FDR accomplished by meeting with and charming newspapermen almost twice a week is difficult to say, but there is little doubt that his radio talks, in particular the early ones, served more to reassure the people than to arouse them.

During his first two years in the White House, Roosevelt delivered only six "fireside chats." None was concerned with specific proposals before Congress. Four were broadcasts during periods of Congressional adjournment, and of the two others, the first, on the banking emergency, was given after his bill had been enacted, and the second, on industrial recovery, was given before legislation had even been drafted for submission to Congress. In all of these addresses, the President told the nation what had been done and what was being done and, significantly, he praised Congress in unreserved terms.

FDR's task during those first years was not mobilizing the nation, for the sense of crisis was already wide-

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spread. Nor did he have to prod Congress, for a majority wanted more New Deal than FDR was willing to give. His job, as James MacGregor Burns points out, was to "ride the Congressional whirlwind" and provide the country's legislators with some program they could back. On the opening day of the special session of 1933, during the brief debate in the House on the emergency banking act, the Republican floor leader said: "The house is burning down and the President of the United States says this is the way to put out the fire." Imagine Charles Halleck or Everett Dirksen making a similar statement today.

By the time of his second term, and after the impressive accomplishments of 1935 without resort to public intervention, the New Deal had lost much of its momentum. Despite the recession of 1937, the sense of national emergency had clearly spent itself in country and Congress alike. Roosevelt's four "chats" in 1937 and 1938 were as warm and stirring as earlier, and probably more forceful. Yet his radio address on the reorganization bill and other pending measures – the closest he ever came to a vigorous public appeal for his legislative program – hardly mattered. After the broadcast, according to Gallup polls, the balance had not shifted; public opinion was still decisively against the reorganization plan. Legislative gains in these years were by no means insignificant, but Congress, as well as the nation, was balking at the President's leadership. The elections of 1936 had brought in a new breed of Congressmen, and even many of the holdovers were tired of "must" bills, tired of relentless activity, tired of the crisis they thought had passed.

"Real-Life Happening"

During the waning of the New Deal, an old man who had been brought up on a marginal farm and who had completed six years of school summed up the dilemma to an interviewer studying the Townsend Movement. "People are too damn lazy to take any interest . . .," he said, "when they've got a little money and a job, and there's more people like that than there are old ones and unemployed. The only time you can get anything done to help the people is in a depression, when they're all poor and worried."

Twenty-five years later, although roughly one-quarter of the population is poor and worried and needs the kind of help government can provide, those most in need have little to do with politics. In England, where the proportion of unemployed is about half ours, workers without jobs recently stormed the House of Commons in protest. Here, despite Kennedy's constant pleas, the most vocal protests about the state of the economy are coming not from the ranks of the unemployed but from the economizers.

In 1937 Roosevelt's plan to reorganize the Supreme Court met a stone wall in the traditional adulation of Americans for an inviolable institution. Although FDR spoke eloquently for his proposal, once at a Democratic victory dinner and again in a "fireside chat," he never won majority popular support. The climate is about the same today for any extensive debate over governmental deficit spending. Whatever the economic realities and objective needs, the balanced budget is ancient and revered wisdom. Any vast campaign to re-educate the public would, I suspect, fall flat. The public will learn, in time, and from experience rather than words. Kennedy needs what Richard Neustadt calls the "real-life happening" if his talk is to have any effect. But Kennedy, as he perhaps too readily admits, cannot manufacture or control most happenings. At best, he can take advantage of an event and ride its crest. Millions of words of expert testimony, public pleas by a few Congressmen, and the repeated urgings by President Kennedy for stricter control of drugs – all fell on deaf ears. Then came thalidomide, news of the deformities of babies being born abroad, and finally revelation that the drug was being used experimentally on thousands of Americans. The mood of the nation changed, the disposition of the Senate Judiciary Committee and Congress changed, and legislation was quickly enacted. Similarly, it would take a catalytic event to resurrect Kennedy's general school bill. As the new Commissioner of Education, Francis Keppel, remarked, the necessary sense of urgency for public school improvement might be instilled if some calamity occurred – 150 children burned up in a wretched school in New York – but this would be a high price to pay.

At times it may be strategically unsound to expand the arena of debate. On the Trade Expansion Act last year the Administration went as far toward avoiding public agitation as was possible. The reason was that any campaign which increased popular attention would probably have brought into action otherwise apathetic persons with latent protectionist sentiments. Instead, Kennedy pursued the successful strategy of negotiating and trading with industrial and labor groups in order to buy off opposition to the bill in advance. This year the situation is almost the same with regard to tax reduction and foreign aid. On taxes, the formation of the Business and Finance Committee for Tax Reduction under Henry Ford II promises to bring greater dividends than any popular appeal by the President. On foreign aid, the chances of converting the permissive national consensus in its favor into formidable pressure on aid opponents in Congress is slight indeed.

Thus far Kennedy's leadership of Congress has been extremely cautious. He has relied heavily on gentle persuasion and cajolery, avoiding pitched battles whenever possible. His tactical skill has not gone unreward-

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ed, having accounted for a number of significant victories, including the expansion of the House Rules Committee, the appointment of two pro-Administration Democrats to fill vacancies on Ways and Means, reversal by the House of the Appropriations Committee's slash of public works expenditures, and Senate passage of mass transit and youth opportunities legislation.

Perhaps his commitment to winning has needlessly limited the issues on which he has been willing to stake his professional reputation. Certainly, his idea of Congressional immutability, his solicitude for Congressional prerogatives, and his dedication to short-run palliatives rather than long-range reforms has allowed an important challenge to the Presidency to go almost uncontested. The challenge – altering the balance of power in Congress and revitalizing the institution – is not, however, one to be met by appealing to the people, but by prodding the Democratic leadership, intervening in organizational struggles, and quietly lending Presidential assistance to the faltering campaign for Congressional reform. This is the arena in which Kennedy might more profitably practice his political wizardry.

The Biggest Story in the World

by James Reston

Something seems to be wrong with the press. Everybody is either criticizing us, or what is worse, ignoring us. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., told the American Historical Association in Chicago the other day that, after working in the White House, he was convinced that newspapers were an unreliable guide for the historian. In Britain, the courts have been tossing reporters in jail for refusing to tell where they got their news. In Washington Pierre Salinger is accusing us of managing the news and vice versa. In Cleveland and New York we have had a newspaper strike and lockout for over three months. And when you suggest that the duty to print newspapers in a democracy is more important than the right to strike or lockout, even newspaper folk look at you as if you were out of date and maybe even out of mind.

I think we are in trouble because we have not kept up with the needs of the age. Change is the biggest story in the world today, and we are not covering it adequately; change in the size and movement of our people; change in the nature, location, and availability of jobs; violent change in the cities and on the land; change in the relations between village and town, town and city, city and state, state and nation, and, of course, change in the relations between the empires that are falling and the empires that are rising, the old states that are going down and the new ones that are coming up. The population of the country was 97 million in 1913; it is over 187 million now. The labor force of the country has more than doubled – from 30 million to over 71 million – and the farm workers have dropped from 13.5 million in 1913 to 4.5 million now. We have gone in this time from a predominantly rural to a primarily urban society, from an isolated country with a defense budget in 1913 of $250 million to the most internationalist and involved nation in all history, with a defense budget of $56.7 billion. There were no radio or television stations in 1913, but 2,500 daily newspapers. This total has declined since then to 1,850.

As a matter of fact, the only thing I have found that hasn't changed is the relationship between Presidents and reporters. In 1913 Woodrow Wilson was complaining that reporters asked too many questions, and suggesting that they "go into partnership with me." This was as good an example of "managing the news" as anybody has turned up under President Kennedy.

We are very good at reporting change when it is violent. When the bull-dozers start to change property-values at home or the guns produce change in Cuba or Vietnam, we are there. But we were not very good about reporting the economic and social conditions in Cuba that produced Castro, and we're remarkably indifferent to the unemployed in Pittsburgh and the social and economic conditions in Harlan County, Kentucky, and the Appalachian South.

What we have done in these last 50 years, I think, is to transfer the reporting habits of the police court and the county court house to the great capitals of the world. This was necessary. In fact, I wish we had re-

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tained a little more of the muckraking zeal of those days. But essentially we are – with, of course, notable exceptions – concentrating on the violence of the world as we concentrated on the violence of the police station, and this leaves a vast uncovered area of change.

It is not necessarily violent change that is going to transform the world. In fact, by concentrating on the violent troubles in Berlin, Vietnam, the Congo, Cuba and elsewhere, we have created the impression that our overseas troubles are endless and maybe even insoluble, whereas the truth is that the United States has handled the violent changes of this past generation fairly well. It is not the earthquakes but the tides of history that are bothering us. It is the slow quieter changes of the family, the scientific laboratory, and the electronic computer that are changing the fabric of the world, and it is the reporting of these changes that leaves so much to be desired.

The question here is merely one of degree. I am not suggesting that we leave spot news to the radio and television. I am merely saying that we should give as much space to this deeper strata of news as we do, say, to women's fashions. We do not make fashion news compete for space with Washington spot news. We say that we are going to allocate a few columns to fashions "for another reason." I think we should do at least as much for reports of these quiet revolutions in our cities, laboratories, factories and farms. And the "other reason" here is fairly plain: for unless we report these changes, our people will not adapt to them, and every civilization must either adapt or perish.

When Woodrow Wilson called the reporters to his office for the first time in 1913, he said to them: "The news is the atmosphere of public affairs. Unless you get the right setting to affairs – disperse the right impression – things go wrong. . . ." The atmosphere of change was in the air in 1913 when Wilson made that remark, but we failed to make our people conscious of it, and a World War broke out the following year. We have been in four wars in these 50 years, and unless we adjust to change, we shall probably have some more.

Modern Definition of News

Is the American newspaper doing all it can to make people aware of change? The answers, of course, vary a great deal but in my view too many newspapers are not only under-playing change on their news pages, but are deploring change, inciting opposition to change, and perpetuating rather than destroying popular illusion on their editorial pages.

Part of the trouble, I believe, is that we have not really thought through a modern definition of news. Nobody questions that a splashy revolution in Guatemala is news, but file 1,000 words on the social and political conditions there that will probably cause a revolution next year, and see what happens on the desk of most American papers. Maybe you'll get it in if it's a dull day, and maybe you won't. Sometimes I think we'll do anything for Latin America except read about it. Things don't have to "happen" to be news. They can just be going on quietly, like the unemployment in Pittsburgh or the boom in Houston, or the allocation of most of our scientists to the Pentagon, the Space Agency, and the Atomic Energy Commission. Ideas are news, but they don't always get into the paper. Let Chairman Miller of the Republican National Committee say for the fiftieth time that we should blockade Cuba and tear down the wall in Berlin, and he will be sure to get in the press, but let some thoughtful but unknown professor suggest that we should have a peace plan for Cuba in case one day Castro collapses – which is not a bad idea – and he'll be lucky to get a brief notice outside his home town.

I think we have to rethink not only our definition of news but the allocation of our reporters. We are not covering our own country as well as we should – maybe not even as well as we cover some other countries. Like officials in Washington, we suffer from Afghanistanism: if it's far away, it's news, but if it's close at home, it's sociology. You can get the cream of the graduation class at Columbia to go to Ethiopia for the Peace Corps or the *New York Times*, but try to get them to find out what's going on in the south side of Chicago.

This would change, I'm sure, if we gave men time to do a serious job of reporting on the south side of Chicago and let them move on from there to probe into other areas of poverty and unrest. Also, as this kind of material increased in our newspapers, the attitude of the public toward newspapers would change for the better, and the quality of the men attracted to our profession would improve. For unless I'm wildly mistaken, the people of this country would welcome thoughtful reporting of important changes in our society, and might increase their support and respect for the American newspaper as a result.

If the newspaper is going to dig a little deeper into the strata of our troubled world, it is going to have to recruit harder, and pay better to get the best minds out of the universities. For the more we deal with social and economic change, the more we shall have to turn to the universities for the perspective of history, without which no man can understand our time, and few even endure it.

Finally, the past, if we reach out for scope and excellence, has a lot to teach us in such a re-examination. Hazlitt's 18th Century profiles in "The Spirit of the Age" are still better than the *New Yorker's*, and *The Spectator*, in the 17th Century, has given us a guide

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which few papers since have equaled. "The great and noble objects *The Spectator* ever holds in view," said its editor 300 years ago, "are to correct the vices, ridicule the follies, and dissipate the ignorance [of the age, and to do so] by enlivening morality with wit, and tempering wit with morality."

If we ran that through our computers, we might come out with something at the other end. The 19th Century was the age of the novelist, and this can still be the age of the journalist. At the moment of crisis, men and women are startled out of their preoccupations with private and professional life. At that moment, when they are paying attention, the newspaper can be an educational force of great importance. But we have to make people believe in us again, and this will be done only when we get a broader definition of our duty.

That Attack from Space

by Raymond D. Senter

During recent hearings of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Sen. Stuart Symington (D, Mo.), former Secretary of the Air Force and its frequent spokesman, repeatedly expressed his belief that the Soviets intend to make hostile use of space. The threat of Russian bombardment satellites, he said, would be comparable to that from the ballistic missiles installed in Cuba. Time after time he charged that failure of the Defense Department to authorize billions of dollars for the development of US orbital weapons amounts to "unilateral disarmament." At one point, Symington was moved to ask "why, for the first time in our history, we are arbitrarily denying the military prompt development of the best possible military weapon in this new militarily so important area – space?" His question is not unanswerable, as we shall see.

This specter of an attack from space was set forth most dramatically, if unrealistically, in the June, 1962, issue of *Fortune* magazine in an article entitled "The Fantastic Weaponry." Here is how it was described: "The first visitor crossed the western segment of the Navy's southern radar fence on an otherwise uneventful Saturday afternoon. . . . A second unknown [satellite] was discovered Sunday. By the following Thursday six had been sighted. . . . At 9:00 a.m. Moscow time, a document was delivered to the American Embassy. . . . Soviet ground forces would move into Western Germany within 48 hours. The Soviet Union further advised that six thermonuclear weapons, each 150 megatons in size, were orbiting over the densely-populated regions of North America. If the US or NATO troops interfered with the impending pacification of Europe, these bombs would be brought down immediately upon US territory. A panic flight from major US cities began early Saturday morning. At 11:00 a.m. the President, his advisers and Congressional leaders met to choose between withdrawing from Germany and initiating nuclear war. An hour later the President appeared before a quiet crowd of reporters and television cameramen . . ."In light of the Soviet Union declaration we have decided. . . ."

Here the flight of editorial fancy ends and the reader is left with the implication that the President had to bow to Soviet blackmail.

But why would the Soviet Union limit its threat to six warheads in orbit, when it must have at least 100-200 land-based ICBM's, each capable of carrying warheads larger than any it can put in orbit? Furthermore, within several years this arsenal of Soviet ICBM's will be supplemented by perhaps an equal number of missiles capable of being launched from submarines. If six warheads in orbit were sufficient to produce panic in the US, would not the threat of 106 or 206 warheads, 100 or 200 of them delivered by ballistic missile, be vastly more effective for blackmail?

There is a possible explanation for this editorial oversight in *Fortune* and in Senator Symington's warnings. If the Soviets threaten us with their entire arsenal, the danger from six orbital weapons pales to insignificance and attention would be focused on the real threat of Soviet land and submarine-based ballistic missiles; but since the US Army is responsible for anti-ICBM missiles and the US Navy for anti-submarine warfare, such an appraisal would not argue for expanding the Air Force budget. Indeed, if the Air Force really believed that bombardment satellites were superior to ballistic missiles and bombers, it would be derelict in its duty if it did not urge a cutback in production of its Minuteman ICBM and diversion of RS-70 bomber funds to orbital weapons instead of seek-

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Undefinable Threat

The inability of the Air Force to state specifically what space weapons it might need does not stop it from pressuring for additional billions of dollars beyond the $1.7 billion already approved for military space programs, as evidenced by recent testimony of Gen. Curtis Le May before the House Appropriations Committee: "I do not think you can clearly define the threat from space at this time. If you cannot clearly define the threat, you cannot clearly define the countermeasures [*i.e.* weapons] against it. But . . . we expect threats to emerge. Therefore, we should be doing some work in this area so that we will be capable of countering the threats if they appear or anticipate threats that may appear and . . . have something to counter them with."

ing more funds for both, as it is doing.

Let us reflect on the statement of Lt. Gen. James Ferguson, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development, before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics: "[Soviet] Vostoks have traversed the United States many times. . . . they passed closer to our inland cities than have any enemy craft ever before in our history. . . . This new medium is, therefore, a potential new dimension of danger, and threat, which we cannot afford to ignore." From this we must conclude that either the Soviets are smarter than our own Air Force and can conceive a way to use bombardment satellites more effectively than their existing ICBM's and bombers, or else that the Soviets are so stupid they do not recognize the superiority of their existing weapons. Neither conclusion is plausible.

If we compare the military advantages of delivering a thermonuclear warhead on a distant target by a land or submarine-based missile versus delivering it by satellite, it is immediately apparent that the missile has a sharp advantage in every respect: payload size, accuracy, reliability, invulnerability, surprise and cost. A rocket booster of any given size can always deliver a much larger warhead in a ballistic trajectory than if the warhead has to be placed in orbit. Where the ICBM can be launched from a fixed point on earth whose position has been precisely surveyed, a bombardment satellite must release its weapon while moving at 18,000 mph. A small error in determining satellite position, attitude or heading at the time the weapon is released will produce huge errors. For example, during the MA-7 Mercury mission when capsule troubles caused astronaut Scott Carpenter to delay several seconds in firing his retro-rockets, the capsule overshot its intended recovery area by more than 200 miles! By contrast, the accuracy of today's ICBM enables its warhead to hit within a mile of its intended target.

The ICBM lives in air-conditioned comfort in its underground silo or submarine launcher, with technicians on hand to check its readiness before launch and to perform repairs if needed. A satellite must live in the hostile Van Allen radiation belt, exposed to even more intense radiation from solar flares. The intensity of the natural Van Allen radiation can be increased by a factor of 100:1 by a high-altitude nuclear explosion, as our scientists learned unexpectedly from our July 9 Project Starfish test in the Pacific. The intensified radiation produced by this single test shot caused nearly every satellite in orbit to stop functioning.

Where an ICBM guidance system only has to function properly for two minutes after a launching, the far more complex bombardment satellite must continue to function for days, weeks or months in the hostile space environment. If any one of its thousands of transistors fails because of radiation, it becomes a piece of orbiting junk, or it may drop its weapon on an unintentional target, perhaps on the nation which placed it in orbit.

An ICBM can be fired at any desired target at any instant. But because the earth rotates under a satellite which itself is spinning in orbit, there are long intervals of time when a bombardment satellite is not in position to hit a useful target – unless hundreds of such weapons are placed in orbit.

Tipping One's Hand

There are still other considerations which should make orbital weapons unattractive for the Russians. Despite our best intelligence efforts, no one in the US can say with absolute certainty how many ICBM's the Russians have and exactly where each is located. As the Soviets build up a fleet of missile-launching submarines, this uncertainty is bound to increase. If the Soviets were to adopt bombardment satellites, they would forfeit this important advantage of secrecy. Within minutes after they place a satellite in orbit, it is detected by our extensive network of radars and other censors. Within several hours we can predict its future position with considerable accuracy.

Thus, to mount any large-scale threat from space, the Russians would have to put dozens or hundreds of bombardment satellites into orbit and do so within a relatively short time – several weeks or months – before the satellites begin to re-enter the atmosphere. Even if they did not reveal the offensive purpose of such satellites, this rapid buildup at many times the rate of their current scientific satellite launches, would arouse grave suspicions of hostile intent. At the very least, they would allow us time to place our military forces on a high-level alert, sacrificing the advantages of surprise attack. The Soviets would then be running a grave

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risk that the US would initiate a preemptive strike before the Soviet satellites were ready.

Were the Soviets to place only a few bombardment satellites in orbit as psychological weapons, the numbers involved might not alert us. But obviously such weapons would have no psychological value unless the Russians announced their purpose. In either event, the Russians would have exposed their hand and left their weapons vulnerable to counter-measures.

One of the factors which makes defense against a mass ICBM attack so difficult if not impossible is the element of surprise. Warheads will impact within 15-30 minutes after an attack is first detected by our Arctic radars. If it were possible to obtain several hours or days advance warning of impending attack, to know how many warheads were involved and where and when each would appear, they would be relatively easy targets to knock down. This is precisely the kind of information that Soviet use of bombardment satellites would provide our defenses.

Secretary McNamara has said that the Defense Department is taking steps "to be able to duplicate it [bombs in orbit] if we see a need arise and to be able . . . to destroy such a satellite if they should put it into orbit." The Pentagon is developing a very powerful new rocket booster, the Titan III, which can be used to launch the Dyna Soar orbital glider and has the capacity to put a modest-size nuclear weapon into orbit. McNamara did not go into detail on what is being done to develop the capability of destroying orbital weapons if adopted by the USSR, at least in unclassified testimony released. However, veiled references in the Senate hearing testimony suggest that the Nike Zeus missile is being groomed for an anti-satellite role.

This is small comfort to the Air Force, for if Zeus (which is under Army jurisdiction) can knock down unfriendly satellites, what remains of the Air Force claim that there is a useful military role in space for its pilots? And if that claim is shot down, how persuasively could Senator Symington or anyone else argue that the USAF's budget should be swelled by several billion dollars?

The Elusive Viet Cong

25,000 Guerrillas, 300,000 Sympathizers

by Jerry A. Rose

At the G-2 Army headquarters in Saigon information was received that a large unit of Viet Cong guerrillas had been spotted at Ap Bac in the Mekong Delta. Word was passed to G-3, and routine plans for an operation were immediately drawn up. But no one realized that a careful operational plan had already been established – by the Viet Cong. The guerrillas had deliberately permitted themselves to be seen so that an offensive action would be launched against their position; they would be ready: not merely to defend, but to counterattack.

The attack began normally: T-28 fighter bombers dropped napalm, rockets, and strafed to "clear" the area. Then came the American-piloted helicopters with Vietnamese troops. Three waves of the banana-shaped H-21's landed and took off in rapid succession. No resistance: obviously the guerrillas had fled as usual. The fourth wave settled down.

Then, the Viet Cong unsheathed its claws: machine guns, BAR's, submachine guns, rifles, slashed at the helicopters and the emerging troops. Five helicopters were downed almost immediately. The infantrymen were pinned by fire and their own fear. Counterattack was the only exit. But no Vietnamese officer was willing to stand, bark the orders, lead the troops. An American, Captain Kenneth Good, rose to rally the soldiers. He ran forward, hoping the men would follow. They didn't. Captain Good was brutally cut down.

The fighter bombers returned. For eight hours they beseiged the Viet Cong static assault position. It did no good. The guerrillas were sheltered in clay bunkers

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and foxholes along a canal and a tree-line. There was only one way to pry them out: direct attack on foot.

Reinforcements arrived at a little distance from the battle-line. With slow reluctance they moved toward the conflict and stopped. Beseeched to attack, the Vietnamese officer finally agreed: one man at a time was sent out and slaughtered.

Night fell and still no attack had occurred on the Viet Cong. Under the cover of darkness the guerrillas began to disperse. The next day, a provincial artillery unit zeroed in – on its own troop positions, killing three Vietnamese, almost killing an American General. Three Americans had already been killed, six were wounded; 68 Vietnamese soldiers lay dead, 100 wounded. Not one Viet Cong casualty had knowingly been inflicted – until an American, Lieutenant Colonel John P. Vann, gathered together a hodge-podge fighting unit of Americans (of cooks, typists, etc.), and went after the guerrillas. They captured 32. The guerrillas were taken by total surprise at meeting any resistance whatsoever.

As the Communist guerrillas were dispersing after their attack on the helicopters in the Mekong Delta, far north, in the High Plateau, other Viet Cong troops were slowly gathering around Camp Plei Mrong, a training center for village defenders.

At 1:30 in the morning, the Viet Cong ignited their attack, and suddenly they were inside and outside the camp simultaneously. The ground shook with heavy TNT explosions, grenades, a recoilless rifle, automatic weapons. Fanatic screams of the attacking guerrillas pierced the air. And in the center of the camp, five American Special Forces men fought with the frenzy of cornered animals – a sixth American was in a radio bunker desperately calling for help: reinforcements, an airstrike. Neither came till the battle was safely over.

The battle ended at dawn. But a 100-yard sector of the trench that surrounded the camp was filled with headless, legless and armless bodies. There were 34 wounded (including one American), 35 dead, 74 captured or defected, 104 weapons lost.

Over a battalion of Viet Cong had attacked from the outside, but from the *inside* came the crucial spark: the camp had been infiltrated. Among the 173 village defenders, armed with good weapons, trained by Americans in the use of those weapons, there had been a small group of hardcore guerrillas, living calmly and audaciously under the very eyes of *their* enemy. Yet, each one of the men had been carefully screened and cleared by local Vietnamese officials.

Beyond the barbed wire and within the camp itself were left small tales of the guerrilla's hard life: rusted ammunition, a misfired cartridge refilled and slugged with a nail, unexploded homemade grenades with bamboo handles, a shabby medical kit. With this kind of equipment, the guerrillas not only dared to attack a heavily fortified camp, but they actually overran it.

The day following the night of the attack, and in the following days, Vietnamese troops streamed into Plei Mrong and the surrounding jungles. An artillery unit came to flail wildly at the forests; so did T-28 fighter bombers. Six companies of Vietnamese soldiers were helicoptered in to block the path of the fleeing enemy. But they made no contact with the guerrillas. Why?

Perhaps an American helicopter pilot had the explanation. "Yesterday," he said, "I dropped a whole bunch of those Vietnamese troops into a field. Today I went back to the same field with another load and you know what I saw? That first group was still there in the field, tents up and cooking lunch. They hadn't moved a damn inch."

It was the same story as happened at the battle at Ap Bac. Numerous American military officers became voluble: "I wish I had those damn Viet Cong fighting for me," said a US Army Colonel in acrid admiration. An American Major said: "ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] doesn't hate the VC [Viet Cong]. They know the VC believes in something. The VC have a cause. . . ." Reporters also criticized. So did a US Senator. Finally, General Paul Harkins (chief of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) felt compelled to say: "I believe anyone who criticizes the fighting qualities of the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam is doing a disservice to the thousands of gallant and courageous men who are fighting so well in defense of their country."

In a sense, General Harkins' statement is justified. There is nothing wrong with the Vietnamese foot-soldier. He comes from the same ethnic and cultural background as the Viet Cong guerrilla. The difference of fighting quality between the two lies partly in *motivation*, partly in *leadership*.

Why Do They Fight?

"What motivates those damn guerrillas?" one often hears bewildered Americans ask.

There is an answer to the question which is closely linked to the over-all strategy and tactics employed by the guerrillas. At Ap Bac, the Viet Cong dug into well-camouflaged, well-entrenched positions, knowing they could withstand the heaviest air bombardment. It was a lesson learned at Dien Bien Phu. Plei Mrong was infiltrated, and that too had its precedent. In their highly motivated manner and method, the Viet Cong are following the pattern of the Indo-China War.

People's War, People's Army is a book written by General Vo Nguyen Giap, the man who steered the Viet Minh guerrilla forces to victory over the French in the Indo-China conflict. Now Giap, through infiltrated cadres, is probably directing the war in South

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Vietnam. It is worth the time, therefore, to take a look at what he has to say, especially in view of the heavily increased fighting.

Giap begins with politics: "In the early years [of the Indo-China War], as the political movement of the masses was not strong enough and the enemy's forces still stable, the political mobilization among the masses had all the more to be considered as the main task for preparation of armed insurrection. The propaganda and organization of the masses carried out everywhere in the country, particularly at key points, was of decisive importance."

Thus, "the appropriate guiding principle for activities," says Giap, "was *armed propaganda . . . political activities were more important than military activities, and fighting less important than propaganda. . . .*" The people, he explains, are needed for "building resistance bases in the countryside; to replenish the permanent army; to maintain security and protect production; to serve the front-line and carry out guerrilla activities in war time."

The problem, then, was to win the people. One technique was *armed propaganda*, a euphemistic expression for terrorism. But terrorism is not indiscriminate. At times, it involves the execution of a "traitor" or a "Vietnamese lackey of the imperialists" – performed in a quasi-legalistic sense with a judgment, verdict and decapitation before a gathering of peasants. The Viet Cong have adopted the technique: last year a bus-driver told me how his vehicle was stopped by guerrillas, two government officials seized, executed, and a verdict pinned to their shirts. Before leaving, the Viet Cong guerrillas told the passengers: "This is what we do to traitors. But you are the people and have nothing to fear." But of course, a lesson in fear had been given. Another form of *armed propaganda* is a group of men who do nothing but talk quietly with the people, yet carry weapons to show their strength. But good behavior of the guerrilla *vis-à-vis* the people is extremely important. Giap says time and again: "*Strengthen the monolithic solidarity between the army and the people.* The Vietnamese fighter has always taken care to observe point 9 of its Oath of Honor: 'In contacts with the people, to follow these three recommendations: to respect the people, to help the people, to defend the people . . . in order to win their confidence and affection'. . . ."

And then there is the spoken propaganda which incessantly plies the people with slogans and promises. The Viet Cong has maintained Giap's method, only changed the words. Some of the current propaganda is general:

"Fellow-countrymen, patriots throughout the land!"

"Our people heroically have risen up against aggressors for almost a century. We successfully carried out a nine-year resistance war. Countless lives were sacrificed. We are now resolved not to relapse into slavery."

"To achieve peace, freedom, national unity, to safeguard our own lives and our childrens'."

"Let's stand up! Let's unite! All of us!"

". . . to throw off the barbarous yoke set up by the US Imperialists and Diemist lackeys."

But much propaganda is very specific, directed toward people of a given region, relating definite events (such as arrests or government acts of terrorism), or addressing people by name. Or, there is the tract which begins: "Soldiers and Officers of the Army of South Vietnam," and goes on to give such instructions as: "try with all means to get out of the Army and return home, refuse to be stationed in outposts in the deep jungle, demand to be stationed in town – demand that leave be granted, surrender soon in order to avoid risking your lives."

The South Vietnamese Government has nowhere nearly approached this propaganda finesse. One problem: dedicated cadre, willing to risk their lives in the field to spread the government's message, are lacking.

Diem's Remoteness

One point of difference between Viet Minh and Viet Cong propaganda is particularly interesting. During the Indo-China War, the name of Ho Chi Minh (now the president of North Vietnam) was frequently used to symbolize the man-of-the-people leadership of the resistance movement. The Viet Cong have no such leader – and very seldom refer to Ho Chi Minh. By contrast, the government of South Vietnam does have a leader whose name is well-known: President Ngo Dinh Diem. In the early days of his regime, when he was unknown and desperately needed a tacit mandate from his people, President Diem traveled frequently without much fanfare into the countryside. He met and spoke with the people on a comparatively intimate and informal basis. But in 1958, during an excursion, an attempt was made on Diem's life. Since then, his mode of meeting the people has completely changed. A graphic illustration of this change occurred a few days before last Christmas in the village of Buon Ro Cai.

Buon Ro Cai, in the fertile Krong Kno valley of Darlac province, was under construction: it was to hold some 3,000 *montagnards* – dark-skinned "people of the mountains." The *montagnards* were being gathered from the surrounding mountainous jungles where they had long lived under the influence of the Viet Cong. They would be brought to the village and resettled, either permanently or temporarily. The temporary settlers were to be armed and trained by an American Special Forces team, presumably won over by a civic action unit from the government of Vietnam, and then

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returned to their original villages to defend themselves from the guerrillas. This program, financed and directed by Americans, has been underway for over a year in Darlac province, and has had considerable success: 25,000 *montagnards* in 205 villages have been made *civil irregular defense guards* who maintain an anti-Communist stronghold of some 35,000 square miles on Vietnam's Western frontier. But each step forward is difficult and dangerous. Thus, there were three priorities in Buon Ro Cai: (1) a strong fence of barbed wire and bamboo encompassing the perimeter of the village which would act as a deterrent to a Viet Cong attack (and the Viet Cong were around – only two weeks earlier in this same region, they had launched a heavy attack on a government outpost); (2) thatched longhouses to quarter the people, men, women and children; (3) winning the good will of the people through medical care, distribution of food, and talk – telling them why they were in the village and what they could expect in the future (schools, medical treatment, a marketplace, etc.).

However, it was learned that President Diem was going to visit Buon Ro Cai on Christmas day. New priorities were immediately ordered by a Vietnamese Major. He insisted that picket-like fences be erected within the village itself – this would make the village pretty.

"Personally, I find it a rather unrewarding job."

Neither the fortifying fence nor the houses had been completed. The *montagnard* men – who for two years or more had been constantly plied with Viet Cong propaganda – were put to work, guarded and prodded by Vietnamese soldiers (when asked how much he was getting paid for his work, one *montagnard* man replied bitterly: "*Cadeau*," meaning his work was a "gift" to the government). A Vietnamese Army Engineering Unit came to raise a flagpole. Part of a civic action team arrived. They took some primitive, bare-breasted native women, dressed them, gave them rifles and began to drill them in parade formations (Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, the president's sister-in-law, has a fixation about fighting females). Children, who speak only their native *Mnong* dialect, were herded together and taught songs in Vietnamese. Then, a whole battalion of Vietnamese Army recruits came from a training camp over 200 miles away. A peeved American officer was with them – he said: "Hell, we can't get these men trained, they're pulled out so often for the President's protection."

The protection turned out to be unnecessary. The President never arrived in Buon Ro Cai.

Personal Leadership

In some senses the Vietnamese people are political anomalies: after more than 20 years of wars which have buffeted them with reams of propaganda, they have attained a good deal of political sophistication, and expect certain things from their government and leadership; yet they remain basically a simple people who also need a fatherly leader, a man whom they feel is one of them, though slightly elevated.

Thirty miles from Saigon, I spoke to a peasant farmer harvesting his rice. The man was unable to read or write, but could say with a touch of bleakness: "I saw the President once. He passed on the road in a big black car. There were many motorcycles around him."

In underdeveloped countries irrational appeal is the keynote: in Vietnam's neighboring country, Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk is king-god to his people and speaks to them in the earthy language of a tiller; the Cambodians worship Sihanouk as an idol and love him as a relative. The *mystique* is all-important and can override rumors and accusations of corruption and ineptitude as has beset the government of Vietnam. Leadership, warm and personal, which can emanate down to the lowliest official and in turn be communicated to the people, is lacking.

Personal, not abstract, concern with individuals is also absent in the Army of South Vietnam. Relations between soldiers and officers are strictly stratified. In *People's War, People's Army*, General Vo Nguyen Giap has much to say on the subject of officer-soldier relationship: "We must always take care *to strengthen*

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the monolithic solidarity within the Army. The relation between the officers and soldiers, between the higher and lower echelons, between one branch and another, is the relation of solidarity between comrades based on political equality and class love."

While some of this sounds like hackneyed Communist rhetoric, Giap continues with a detailed account of what took place in the Viet Minh: ". . . at grass-root level, democratic meetings and Army congresses were held regularly so that men as well as officers had the opportunity to speak their views on fighting, work, study and living questions. In our Army, not only have the officers the right to criticize the soldiers but the latter also have the right to criticize the former."

Giap is deadly serious. The method he outlines was actually used in forming a force of fanatic fighters out of indifferent peasants. General Giap admits that it was not easy to infuse men with a sense of equality and comradeship that he deemed necessary: "In the early stage of the building of the Army, a number of officers tainted with the militarist manner and habits of previous armies, advocated absolute reliance on orders and punishment in the management of the Army . . . overlooking education and persuasion."

Unfortunately, the commentary applies to the Army of South Vietnam. It also happens to be an observation on Vietnamese society. Traditionally, Vietnamese society is based on a very strict hierarchy which stems from the courtly days in the ancient capital of Hue. Surrounding the emperor – who had a "mandate from heaven" to rule – was a vast mandarinate with subtle gradations. Mandarins were educated in esoteric *belles lettres*, passed difficult state exams, and went on to become part of the court or administration. They did little actual work – proudly let the nails of their little fingers grow long to show they did no manual labor (a custom still widely practiced among the educated in Vietnam, even by military officers). The principal pastime of a mandarin was political intrigue.

The mandarin social and political outlook still remains very strong in Vietnam (paradoxically, French colonial rule served to reinforce the whole system): a classical rather than a technical education is most prized (though technicians are badly needed) and incredibly difficult state exams still resemble the ancient mandarin tests; favoritism and nepotism prevail in politics; society is still so highly gradated that men are compulsively obsequious before their immediate superiors and rudely arrogant to their immediate inferiors (a by-product of this social attitude is an absence of initiative: in both the Army and the civil service, men are afraid to make decisions without the approval of their immediate superiors who in turn look to their chiefs, etc.; numerous matters of utmost mundanity end on the President's desk for final decisions). The Communists recognized in the 1920's that such a social system produced great blisters of rancor among the people, and one had only to puncture a sufficient number of blisters to achieve a following. In fact, almost 2,000 years of Vietnamese history, fraught with peasant uprisings, testified to the people's willingness to fight the feudal mandarinate. The population was almost always ripe for revolution, though the Communist organization itself was not – as was demonstrated by abortive efforts at rebellion in the 1930's and in 1945. But the Communist organization did mature, and finally achieved half its goal in 1954. Then it paused to secure North Vietnam. Between 1954 and 1959, not more than 400 South Vietnamese Government war casualties were registered in a year. In 1960, the figure jumped to 4,900; last year the government suffered around 14,000 killed and wounded.

Thus, although the current war was sparked from the outside, the tinder and the flame were within the nation itself. Clearly, by 1960 a great many people in South Vietnam were again ripe for revolution, though most Vietnamese peasants will say: "All we want is quiet. We don't care who wins." President Diem failed to pursue a solid land reform, grew aloof from his people, and instinctively began to rigidify the social and political hierarchy.

Diem acted on instincts which had been developed as a young man: he graduated from the French School of Law and Administration in Hue, thereafter spent time in the archives of the imperial city doing research on old political institutions, and then (says his official biography) "entered the mandarinate [corps of high civil servants] . . . and reached the top very rapidly."

However, the country did not need old institutions, but totally new ones. And therein lies the political root of the war in South Vietnam. Now, the question, particularly for Americans, is this: Can one permanently remove the grown tree of subversion with a military-economic axe, while the root still lives?

The Principles of Giap

"In general," Giap says, "our Resistance War was a *guerrilla war moving gradually to regular war, from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare combined with partial entrenched camp warfare*." Practically speaking, these stages do not proceed neatly from one to two to three. There was considerable shuttling back and forth between stages, and "loss of patience, eagerness to win swiftly" frequently made things more difficult; it took a considerable propaganda effort to establish the proper psychological tone among his forces.

There are three types of Viet Cong forces. On the lowest level are "para-military organizations" – three to 30 men armed with several guns, grenades and

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knives. They commit tiny acts of terrorism (such as killing a minor official – even boy scout leaders have been assassinated) to maintain fear and tension within a small locale. "Regional troops" generally operate in a province, attack weak outposts or government paramilitary units – about two-thirds of the "regional" forces are armed with weapons. "Regular units" are hardcore, well-trained, completely armed – sometimes with machine guns, recoilless rifles and mortars – and shift around through large sectors of the country. When attacking an objective, they are aided by "regional," and "guerrilla" forces, and even by local people whose job is to remove the dead and wounded (in order to destroy the morale of the enemy and to create an aura of invincibility around itself, the Viet Cong tries never to leave its dead on the battlefield – this also makes it extremely difficult for the government to reach any accurate estimate of inflicted casualties).

Giap makes it clear that there is only one main tactical principal for a successful guerrilla force (outside of incessant indoctrination of that force to maintain its morale): "Is the enemy strong? One avoids him. Is he weak? One attacks him." And there is only one logistic principle, *"self-reliance":* "Our troops looked for their supplies on the battlefields, capturing the enemy weapons to arm themselves, economizing in munitions. . . ."

The Viet Cong have adopted exactly the organizational, strategic, tactical, and logistic principles laid down by Giap. As for the guerrilla warfare's *stage* of development, it has shuttled back and forth (as Giap says it will) – but thus far mostly between stages one and two. The key to stage three is the ability to capture and permanently hold an area even against a heavy attack, and this the Viet Cong cannot do. There is no area in South Vietnam which the guerrillas can *militarily* maintain against a mass attack of government forces. The Viet Cong have yet to assault any single government position with more than a battalion. Nevertheless, the guerrillas have several times attempted to take the first step from stage two to stage three. In the fall of 1961, for example, they overran a provincial capital, Phuoc Thanh, and went to great efforts to publicize the event. However, shortly after their "big victory," American military aid began to pour in, and the Viet Cong retreated almost all the way back to the 1954-59 era of stage one. By mid-1962, they were solidly back in stage two. Now, once again, they are trying to ascend to the third stage, the final phase of victory – which took about three and a half years to reach in the Indo-China War.

Two important factors which helped the Viet Minh to victory are mentioned only vaguely by Giap. One was Chinese help after 1949 (his "self-reliance" principal not withstanding); the other also occurred in 1949; Laos was made an independent state within the French Union and was thereby withdrawn from the field of battle but became a key logistic route for supplies from China to South Vietnam. The Southern part of Laos has long been controlled by the Communists, and Tchepone particularly – only a few miles from the Laotian-South Vietnam border – is a well-known military base supplied by Russian planes with Russian equipment, maintained by Laotian and North Vietnamese personnel.

The Crucial Element

As supplies and a certain number of troops must come from the rear, *i.e.* North Vietnam via Laos, it is logical that one of the first objectives of the Viet Cong is to seize parts of the High Plateau (West Central Vietnam). The Viet Cong did this as far back as 1960, and only now – with such programs as the one in Darlac – is their hold being weakened. Another crucial area is Zone D – or roughly Phuoc Thanh province – which is a pivotal control point just north of Saigon. From Zone D, the guerrillas can harrass traffic from Saigon to points north while establishing key bases which are supplied via Cambodia or the High Plateau. The Plain of Reeds is also a key location because it borders Cambodia and its marshy terrain makes government operations extremely difficult. From the Plain of Reeds the guerrillas strike into the economic heart of Vietnam: the Mekong Delta. From July, 1961, to November, 1962, Vietnam was unable to export any rice, its principal commodity for earning foreign exchange. The Viet Cong will undoubtedly make great efforts to again disrupt the flow of rice during this current harvest. (Giap, incidentally, says that one of the basic paths to a revolution's victory is disruption of the economy.) These are the three main guerrilla strongholds; minor ones include the coastal mountains and the marshland on the southern tip of Vietnam – the Caman Peninsula.

All of these areas have been combed and recombed by government mopping-up operations. Occasionally there is a fight; more frequently, the troops walk through the land, through the villages, and find nothing. The guerrillas have hidden or merged with the populace. In either case, only the people know who and where the guerrillas are. And the people are silent.

There are only 17,000 to 25,000 hardcore well-armed guerrillas in South Vietnam today. Against this force are arrayed the 510,000 men of Diem, almost all carrying good weapons. But the Viet Cong can claim around 300,000 unarmed yet adamant sympathizers. Therein lies the crucial element.

In 1961, to win or at least control the population, the Diem government with massive US aid (in money,

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matériel and manpower) embarked on a strategic hamlet plan. The idea is to turn hamlets into tiny fortresses surrounded by moats, earth embankments and fences. Already existing hamlets of fair size are thus fortified. In regions where hamlets run no larger than 12 families, the people are rounded up and new hamlets constructed. A certain number of resident men are trained and armed to discourage a Viet Cong attack. In addition to the military face of the program, these strategic hamlets are designed to revolutionize the social mode of the country from rural to urban. Marketplaces, schools, medical dispensaries are supposed to be built in each hamlet. By the end of last year the government claimed over 4,000 hamlets had been established, enclosing 5.5 million villagers (39 percent of Vietnam's total population).

The sheer number of hamlets, though generally thought to be exaggerated, worries American officials. It also worries British experts from Malaya, where the program was first employed so successfully. The Vietnamese farmer is extremely attached to his land, his sign of wealth, the home of his ancestors. Uprooting him must be done with extreme caution. He must see immediate economic and social advantages for himself and his family if he is moved, or even forced to work for weeks in digging moats and building fences. The military aspects of a strategic hamlet mean nothing to him for he will tell you (if he trusts you): "We're the people. The Viet Cong doesn't bother us." The government *is* bothering him, and he must see some compensation for his trouble – or else each fence can be counted as a feather in the Viet Cong's cap.

"Only fences of people are worth a damn," an American Colonel said to me. General Giap would agree.

The strategic hamlet plan can work, but it must be a *slow* revolution, executed with patience so that each step is secure before the next is taken. One of the pressing problems (as in the case of propaganda dissemination) is the lack of well-trained and dedicated government cadre who are willing to go into the field to serve as teachers, medical technicians and administrators.

Politics, the Root

And so we return to where we started in Giap's book: politics, the root. Organizationally, the Army of South Vietnam and the Viet Cong are broken down in almost the same way: local self-defense units, provincial forces and regular troops – but in addition the Diem Government has Special Forces, a Marine Corps, artillery units, paratroops, a navy, an air force. With American armaments, with complete freedom of movement for supply, the Vietnamese Army logistically far outclasses the Viet Cong. The military strategy of the combatants is parallel: both are set for a long war; both are intent on securing the same geographic objectives.

Tactically, the South Vietnamese government is faced with one factor that is both an advantage and disadvantage: it controls definite areas which permit the troops a rest and a family life; but many of these areas are guarded by outposts that are sitting ducks for a planned attack. This tactical disadvantage may be unavoidable, but there is one which the government can avoid and doesn't. "Possessing to the extreme, dynamism, initiative, mobility and rapidity of decision in the face of new situations," says General Giap, is the fulcrum of mobile warfare. The military force of Vietnam does not have these possessions and therefore suffers a severe lack of flexibility, as is repeatedly illustrated in its slow reaction time both on the battlefield and coming to the support of beseiged outposts. Another aspect of this same quality lack is an unshakable distaste of the Vietnamese Army for moving in units smaller than a company (90-135 men), though American officers incessantly plead for smaller patrols. The point is that one cannot catch elusive guerrillas by stampeding men through a quiet terrain.

"Dynamism, initiative, rapidity of decision. . ." – the South Vietnamese soldier can possess these qualities if he is permitted and sees a reason to possess them. But again, motivation in the Army – the *esprit de corps* – must stem from its leadership, and in a country as small as Vietnam the whole tenor of leadership is set by the man at the top.

It is accepted that President Ngo Dinh Diem is dictatorial, that the people lack freedom. American diplomats argue that under the circumstance of war, a lack of freedom is inconsequential. I agree. But intimate political leadership that rouses the people *is* consequential to victory. During the Indo-China War, the Viet Minh managed to collect a civilian force of 200,000 people for the battle of Dien Bien Phu alone. Through terrible jungles, over mountains, across rapid streams, exposed to disease and constant bombing and strafing attacks,

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these people using bicycles, sampans and mostly bamboo shoulder-poles carried tons of food and munitions for the Viet Minh troops.

A peasant farmer who had been among those porters at Dien Bien Phu once told me simply: "We got very tired and were most afraid of getting sick. Our wives cried when we left." I then asked him if he *willingly* carried supplies. He nodded "yes."

Needed – a Magsaysay

The Philippines after World War II was faced with a large force of Communist guerrillas, the Huks, who not only dominated vast sections of the countryside but even terrorized the capital city, Manila. In 1950, Ramon Magsaysay became Secretary of Defense, and President in 1953. By the time of his unfortunate death in 1956, Magsaysay had eradicated the Huks, not so much by military force, but by the dynamic personality of his leadership. He traveled constantly throughout the country, striking up an aura of intimacy and friendship with soldier and civilian alike. It was the "I'm-one-of-you" technique (in fact, he was born of poor parents), and it worked to create a fanatically loyal Army and civilian populace – loyal to Magsaysay, not an ideology. As he said, shortly before his death: "While the rank and file of the Communist movements are the ignorant, the disgruntled laborers, the poor people in the barrios – those who do not even understand Communism as an ideology – the leaders are often educated middle-class or well-to-do intellectuals." Poverty, he pointed out, was not the *cause* of Communism, but rather the *condition* under which clever leadership could develop a backing. Magsaysay proved that under the very same condition, a non-Communist leader can also develop a strong backing. As President, he took large steps to solidify his support with concrete economic measures.

Vietnam needs a Magsaysay.

Sen. Mike Mansfield, one of the earliest and most ardent supporters of Ngo Dinh Diem, recently took a trip to Vietnam. On his return to the US, he reported that despite seven years of US aid, South Vietnam "appears less, not more, stable than it was at the outset. . . . It appears more removed, rather than closer to, the achievement of popularly responsible and responsive government." He pointed out that the war is not wholly to blame for this situation, that President Diem and the US "must bear a very substantial share of the responsibility." A "massive job of social engineering is needed," said Mansfield. Those truly concerned with Vietnam applaud the Senator's insight, and wish that Admiral Harry D. Felt would be equally sober – and truthful. Instead, Felt has stated publicly that the war will be over in three years. "Some 10.5 million Vietnamese," said Felt recently, are coming "over to the government side and being separated from the Viet Cong." But why *should* these people come over to the government side?

Opportunities of personal advancement for the poor are almost non-existent in South Vietnam. Farmers work their paddy fields as they did a millenium ago. New roads have been built, but 80 percent of the countryside is still without electricity – in 1962, not one electric generator was delivered to Vietnam, though an atomic reactor was. The socio-political structure of the country is only nominally different from what it was under the mandarinate, and the ruler of Vietnam today is no closer to his people than were the emperors.

The one major change lies within the minds of the people. They see lights, schools, medical facilities, nice clothes, cars, people at leisure in the larger villages. They wonder if they will ever have any of it, and if not, why not, and if so when?

To ignore these social-economic conditions, to ignore the political-psychological requirements of the people, to maintain that a guerrilla war can be won by primarily military means and a few economic measures is to ask for defeat. The French thought they could subdue the guerrillas with guns; and they lost. The Dutch thought they could subdue the Indonesian guerrillas with guns; and they lost. Chiang Kai-shek thought he could subdue Mao's guerrillas with guns; and he lost. Magsaysay in the Philippines and General Templer in Malaya thought that guns were not enough to subdue guerrillas; and they won.

Those who lost stoutly maintained that they were winning till defeat was hammered down their throats. Grounds for optimism can always be found, particularly in casualty figures; the French, the Dutch, and Chiang Kai-shek used the rising number of enemy killed and wounded to justify their rosy vision of the war's progress. Now Harry Felt does too.

But a tough-minded American Colonel in Vietnam said to me: "I hope like hell those enemy KIA's (killed in action) go down, and fast!"

"Why?" I asked, astonished.

"Because when the enemy's casualties decrease," the Colonel replied "it means that less innocent peasants are being killed."

There, in a nutshell, is the tragic picture of the war in South Vietnam; and therein lies the increasing danger of defeat: the people's burden of hopelessness. Any other vision is inaccurate.

Not long ago, General Collins, Commander of the US Army Pacific, asked an Indonesian Army officer how he thought the war in South Vietnam was going.

The officer answered: "What do you want, the Mansfield version or the Felt version?"

The US would do well to heed Mansfield's version.

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"Lord of the Flies" Goes to College

Lord of the Flies, by the British novelist, William Golding, depicts the regression of a group of shipwrecked schoolboys into a lawless and nearly savage state. Heavily laden with symbolism and allegory, the book has become increasingly popular with American undergraduates since it was published in a paperback edition by Putnam in 1959. *The New Republic* has invited faculty members of four universities to account for this popularity. Their explanations, and a conversation between Golding and Douglas Davis, follow.

Lord of the Flies is popular, indeed, on the UCLA campus – popular enough to be on a tight reserve schedule in the university library and to be almost constantly out of stock at the student book store. However, the informal survey by which I attempted to assay the literary taste of this segment of our campus generation and the reason for the boom in Golding's novel resulted in the brief but conclusive reaction: "It's assigned."

Of course, *Lord of the Flies* is assigned. Too new, perhaps, to be required reading in English classes, it is certainly talked about there. But it is required reading in courses in the Department of Political Science, particularly courses in the history of political ideas and the analysis of the problems of political theory. Labor leaders who come to UCLA extension lectures on the liberal arts hear that William Golding's novel is a beautifully compacted statement of "the evolution of the differing responses to the necessity of government." And the sixty-six Peace Corps volunteers now on the campus, training for service in Nigeria, are expected to learn from their assigned readings in *Lord of the Flies* about the essential conflict between man's individual well being and the rules of society.

So much for campus popularity. That undergraduate tastes, in some respects, may be largely a reflection of professorial inclinations are, perhaps, what are referred to as the advantages of education.

J. M. Edelstein
University of California at Los Angeles

Most contemporary novels languish on our libraries' shelves and retain their bright newness for months – only the instructor who is "keeping up" bothers to look inside the covers. But the Golding is torn and ragged from use, and there are always "holds" on the single library copy. (Our undergraduate library now has a new second copy – bought in response to the demand – but there has been no request that this copy be made available for immediate use, nor has the reserve section asked for copies. This indicates that at the University of Colorado the interest is self-impelled, whereas at UCLA there is a sort of greenhouse "forcing.")

A cursory check revealed that the local student bookstore has had over 150 requests for the paperback version – incredible for a group that doesn't buy many books. And a check of both honors students and an "average" class showed that almost all of the students had heard of the book and about 10 percent had actually read it.

I think that some recent critics have been too sanguine about the reasons for reading Golding – among them being that the students recognize the philosophical concepts. Whatever yearnings they have to discover, articulate expressions of their dilemmas are so fuzzy that there can be no real focusing on, say, a Golding novel as an explicit answer. But Golding has struck a nerve; that in itself is encouraging.

One interesting note: The English edition (Faber) states on the dust jacket that a school edition with an introduction and notes on the text is available – details upon application. Perhaps in England as well as in some universities here the book has become "required" reading. If this is so, I'm inclined to say, God help Mr. Golding – he might make a lot of money, but his place may be reserved alongside those unlucky authors who are loathed because they represent schoolroom drudgery.

P. K. Whalen
University of Colorado

The Golding fashion among undergraduates has not, as yet at least, reached anything resembling the dimensions of the Salinger fashion which was operative on American campuses even five years ago, but those who like the book like it with a passionate intensity which tends to fly at the throat of adverse criticism of any sort. The spell exerted by *Lord of the Flies* (and, for those who have read it, by *The Inheritors*) seems to reside in its combination of fast-paced and violent action, all-embracing and rather facile pessimism, and heavy-handed and obvious symbolism. Both books devote much energy to telling us that they are profound, and youth has a weakness for profundity almost as fatal as its weakness for *Weltschmerz*.

Not youth alone, and not all youth. Some elders in the area, academic and otherwise, find Golding's combination of Edgar Rice Burroughs and crisis theology equally irresistible, whereas some of the undergraduate literature majors – I think especially of an attractive and articulate engaged couple who are among my best students – have expressed deep dissatisfaction with what they regard as the pretentiousness, ob-

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viousness, and oversimplification of works recommended with so much ardor by friends and teachers. Without too much hesitation, I would venture the prediction that the Golding craze, though certainly as silly, will prove neither as significant nor as long-lived as the cult of Salinger.

Frank J. Warnke
University of Washington

Somewhat more than a third of the students I asked (mostly freshmen and sophomores) have read *Lord of the Flies;* and Golding drew a large crowd when he gave a lecture here last year. According to the Co-op bookstore the book is currently assigned in only one classroom – one of the seminars for honors juniors in English: the instructor is using *Lord of the Flies* as one work in a study of modern pastoral – or anti-pastoral. The novel is also listed as suggested reading for incoming freshmen – but that list, put out by the Freshman Office, is not required and does not represent an attempt to get incoming students at Yale to read this or that book.

Why is *Lord of the Flies* a good book? "It shows what people are really like underneath," etc. My own explanation would credit more to Golding's handling of terror and suspense – with the political parable making the terror and suspense seem *important.* The publishing history is certainly odd. Perhaps the past twenty years *have* witnessed a substantial change in American outlook, and the idea that we are savages underneath has become more commonplace. Perhaps college communities are more volatile in reflecting such a change. I don't know. When I read *Lord of the Flies* a couple of years ago, I was careless of the dates and imagined Golding was writing about the *next* war. Perhaps he was.

Alexander Welsh
Yale University

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A Conversation with Golding

by Douglas M. Davis

Davis: Lord of the Flies *is having a great success in America. It will sell over 100,000 copies in paper this year, most of them on the campus. Carlos Baker claims that you are "catching up to Salinger" among American students, yet* Lord of the Flies *pictures youth as brutal and mean, very different from Salinger's sweet, sensitive, adolescents.*

Golding: I think both mine and Salinger's are valid pictures. My children are sub-adolescents faced with a sub-adolescent world. His hero is a post-adolescent faced with an adult world. The two are quite different, aren't they?

Some critics feel Salinger's youths are too good to be real.

I don't think so. Most boys at the age he writes about are uncorrupted. This isn't innocent goodness, mind. This is merely a rather enviable state of suspension – a prelude, if you will – between the adult and the youthful worlds. It seems to me Salinger has a tremendous nostalgia for this period. It is beautiful, his nostalgia, and it makes his books seem beautiful.

Some people find the difference between you and Salinger to be representative of the classical difference between those who see man as basically good – that is, perfectable – and those who see him as evil, condemned to his own frailties. Do you agree?

I'm not saying anyone is evil. I set out to discover whether there is that in man which makes him do what he does, that's all. When I was young, before the war, I did have some airy-fairy views about man, though I wasn't a Marxist (you'll find, I think, that the Marxists are the only people left who think humanity is perfectable). But I went through the war and that changed me. The war taught me different and a lot of others like me.

In Lord of the Flies, *the shipwrecked planeload of children splits into two camps – one led by Jack Merridew, devoted to savagery and hunting, the other by Ralph, who tries to keep the island at peace and follow the "rules." Now though Ralph comes out a poor second to Jack in their struggle for mastery of the island, you make a very strong case for Ralph and all he represents (i.e., "parliament" or "the rules"); that is to say – you strongly enlist the sympathies of the reader for a losing cause (and I take it you feel that adult society is lost in an even more hopeless way).*

My sympathies are with Ralph, yes. But I don't think that he will necessarily win out because he's likeable. After all it's only when you have a

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Notes on Contributors

Two of the contributors to the Golding discussion – J. M. Edelstein *and* P. K. Whalen *are librarians.* Frank J. Warnke *is a professor of English,* Alexander Welsh *of history.* Douglas M. Davis *interviewed several British men of letters on his most recent trip to England.*

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fairly protected society – as America has been for most of its existence – that you can develop a genuinely fair society. Athenian democracy didn't survive. Rome began as a democracy, then found out it couldn't run an empire, and finally collapsed under its own weight.

I think all this is something Americans should deduce certain lessons from. I would have liked Ralph to "make it," but he couldn't. The "nice guy" frequently loses.

Do you write quickly?

I think I'm rather slow, in one sense, fast in another. I've got to think a long time before writing. I do two or three drafts. *The Inheritors* was written in twenty-eight days. I wrote the draft of my next novel in America in sixteen days, which is pretty fast, I suppose, but you see I had been thinking about it for two or three years. When you think about finished work, I'm slow by comparison. In eight years I've written four novels. That isn't much.

You've just returned from a year in Virginia. What did you think of the United States?

Two points. First, I can't imagine more kindness anywhere. Not only on campus. We drove across the country, you know, and wherever we went, the same reaction. Our car broke down in the West and we had people not only offering tools and directions but actually doing the job. I don't think you'd find that in many countries. Second, the extraordinary difference between the political image presented by America – waving of the unsheathed sword and so forth – and the pervasive gentleness one finds everywhere.

How do you find American students?

I lectured to a good many, of course, in every part of the country. They are all very interested, extremely interested in what I am saying. Extremely eager students, yes. But it is also perceptible that in America, age for age, they are content with a less detailed knowledge of my subject, English, than we are. They tend to have a "digest" view of literature, you know. This is not at all

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true on the graduate level, of course, where details are very important.

Who are your favorite American writers?

I'm a bit in trouble here. For fifteen years, after the war, I read nothing but classical Greek, not because it was the snobbish thing to do or even the most enjoyable, but because this is where the meat is. I don't know many American writers, unfortunately. I know my own contemporaries here, and in the States I know some. I was brought up on Mark Twain. I know and admire Robert Penn Warren and William Styron, of course. Faulkner, too. Hemingway's *Old Man and the Sea* is a favorite, though I'm told I shouldn't like it. Robie Macauley's *Descent of Venus* is another favorite. That's about it, I'm afraid, save Salinger, whom I've already mentioned. I like your writers by and large. You've got tremendous energy in your literary world.

Diets for Tiny Minds

by Christopher Jencks

The Censors and the Schools is neither thorough scholarship nor brilliant social criticism, but it is good journalism. Written by two Southern newspapermen who spent last year at Harvard on Nieman Fellowships, the book chronicles the activities in this field of such organizations as the DAR and America's Future and individuals such as E. Merrill Root (a slightly crack-brained poet who once taught at Earlham College in Indiana) and J. Evetts Haley (a former historian of the Old West who left the University of Texas many years ago to preach the frontier virtues to a wider public). The book records a multitude of idiocies, the most famous and ludicrous probably being *The Los Angeles Herald's* attack on a school song book which included "Swing the Shining Sickle," a harvest tune which was said to reflect Moscow influence.

The Censors and the Schools
by Jack Nelson and Gene Roberts, Jr.
(Little, Brown; $4.50)

Aside from its dull style, the main defect of *The Censors and the Schools* is its concluding chapter. After some months of research the authors have only banalities to offer; they merely quote approvingly such aphorisms as that we should judge textbooks "on the basis of *their merits* and not *our prejudices*," and that we should "substitute understanding for misunderstanding." There would, in other words, be less censorship if more people actively opposed it. Who these potential opponents might be, the authors do not hint.

One possibility is that political liberals could be mobilized against the reactionaries who now do most of the censoring. But on closer scrutiny this proves a poor answer. So long as local boards of education are in charge, there will be some communities in which there are no liberals. Should children there be deprived of a chance to study history as leading scholars see it? Furthermore, where the liberals are in a majority, they are just as ready to tamper with textbooks as conservatives: they just want to censor different things. Instead of removing pictures of integrated classrooms, like the Georgia school board, they want to remove 19th Century poems which refer to "darkies." Or, to give a more significant recent example, they persuade the New York City Board of Education to issue an ultimatum to publishers of American history texts, saying that if the publishers want their texts used in New York in the future they will have to give more emphasis to "the role of minorities in American history." So long as the content of textbooks is to be determined by local political necessities, many of us would no doubt prefer that the dogma be liberal rather than conservative. But what we really need is machinery which makes it natural for every school child to have access to *all* views.

The only way to do this so far as I can see would be for school teachers to

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emulate college professors in trying to establish a tradition of academic freedom and controversy. One of the most depressing aspects of the Nelson-Roberts account is that they report not a single instance of organized resistance to censorship by classroom teachers or administrators. At first glance the explanation seems simple enough: teachers aren't organized to protest, they are organized to go along. Most of them are affiliated only with the local branch of the National Education Association, an organization whose working principle is that since "we all believe in education," conflicts between the board of education and the classroom teacher should be settled by persuasion, not coercion. Boards of education, however, operate under no such illusions, and coerce whenever persuasion fails. The result is a somewhat unequal struggle – which, in the NEA's view, is as it should be, for "we all believe in local control of education."

But even if the teachers were organized independently of the principals and superintendents, so that they could pressure local school administrators and board members, perhaps by threats of massive resignations, it is far from certain that these organizations would go to combat for academic freedom.

Most schools are staffed by young women who do not plan to stay in the classroom for long. They do not have much stake in the long-range development of the local school system, and they are reluctant to lose a paycheck on its account. Their sense of identity derives more from their vision of themselves as potential wives and mothers than from their professional status. They do not find it humiliating to take orders from administrators or board members about what they should and shouldn't do in the classroom; indeed, some find it positively gratifying, for it reinforces their ideas about the proper relations between the sexes. Even those who do resent interference and would like the freedom to tell the truth as they see it, think it would be unfeminine to create too much of a fuss – to become crusaders or martyrs. Perhaps they are right; but if it would be "unfeminine," we had better get more male teachers. As a group, teachers are desperately afraid of conflict.

So long as schools are staffed as they are, then, I doubt that teachers will fight censorship. And if they won't, who will? Perhaps somebody will, but my own feelings is that they would be wasting much of their time. After all, what difference does censorship make? To some this will seem a shocking question, but I mean it seriously. Censorship can be no more important in the overall educational picture than the books that are censored, and my guess is that these books are not so important as outsiders, who can see the text but cannot see the classroom image.

Southern students aren't made into racists by looking at a few textbook pictures of lily white classrooms, and they wouldn't be made into liberals by looking at pictures of integrated classrooms. Nor will the inclusion or deletion of complimentary references to the New Deal make much difference in a community where people still speak of That Man. The real issue is not what appears briefly in a textbook, but how the teacher presents this, day in and day out, in the classroom. If the teacher speaks up for racial equality, then pictures are superfluous. If she does not, they are useless. If the teacher tries to discuss the New Deal as if it mattered, as if it was more than NRA + NCC + REA, he will usually spark a real classroom debate. In that case it makes no difference how the text handles the topic. If, on the other hand, the teacher doesn't precipitate a lively discussion the students are unlikely even to remember what the New Deal was after the exam, much less be influenced by what the text said.

Most school districts probably would not buy a really good textbook even if it were available. They might, however, unwittingly hire a really good teacher, who might, in turn, overcome the defects of the texts. But to do this, he would need better college preparation than he now gets. Prospective history teachers would need, for instance to devote some of their colleges courses to looking at the innocuous texts they will be using. University scholars ought to show the would-be teacher how the textbook oversimplifies or distorts history, and should train the novice to find



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materials which will give a proper balance picture.

Yet having proposed this to several professors at teachers colleges I can report that the idea got a very poor reception. At first I was told that it was impractical because you couldn't tell which textbooks the teachers would be using in the future. When I explained that that was the whole point, and that they ought to be trained to do without textbooks, or at least evaluate them critically, I was told that this would never do, that such teachers would get into trouble when they took their first job. Exactly. In a city like Greenwood, Mississippi, of course, a teacher who doesn't get into trouble is a disgrace to his profession. But then, it is quite certain that if he did stick his neck out, his colleagues wouldn't back him up. So long as that remains true, perhaps it is the profession which is a disgrace, not individual teachers.

Sorme Likes It Hot

by Stanley Kauffmann

Neither Colin Wilson nor his publisher tells us that his new novel is a sequel to his previous one, *Ritual in the Dark*. Students of his work, who are probably not numberless, will recall that in the earlier book Gerard Sorme, a young writer in London, becomes friends with a wealthy eccentric, Austin Nunne, and through him meets two women, aunt and niece, with both of whom Sorme commences affairs. Nunne is a sadistic homosexual who, because he is infatuated with Sorme and knows his cause is hopeless, vents his frustrations by murdering and mutilating seven women. Sorme is appropriately horrified but resilient. At the end of the lengthy chronicle, he has just arranged another rendezvous with the niece.

The Sex Diary of Gerard Sorme
by Colin Wilson
(Dial; $4.95)

> "A curious elation stirred in him, an acceptance of complexity. He stared at his face in the mirror, saying aloud: What do you do now, you stupid old bastard? He grinned at himself, and twitched his nose like a rabbit."

Rabbit, indeed. What he does do now, in this second installment, is to continue his affairs with niece and aunt, acquire several other mistresses, fall in love with the young wife of an elderly composer and seduce her. Meanwhile, he and most of the others – including a 14-year-old girl – get involved with a bisexual necromancer of whom Nunne was a kind of rough draft but who is modeled more closely on the infamous Aleister Crowley. Thus this second book, far from being a change of subject or a view of its hero from another angle, merely records further rituals: in the dark, semi-dark, and morning light.

There is a theory behind the book. The earlier novel first broached the belief that life can be lived at a higher pitch of intensity. Here Sorme thinks he has found the way: that the orgasm is one of the principal keys to unlock the door to this intensity; that in the heart of its fire lies the secret of heightened consciousness. The necromancer's claims of knowledges that will prolong sexual climax are what draw Sorme on. But Sorme, like the reader, is bilked. The several scenes of black magic are all preparation and no performance. After all the fuss and mystery, nothing really happens.

One is not supposed, I think, to expect much from this novel in characterization or narrative. The book is intended as a small sea of amniotic juices, a kind of instinctual, semi-mystical exploration of sex as life illuminator and aggrandizer. To demonstrate its candid profundity, the book is studded throughout with aphorisms. Some soundings from the Wilsonian deeps:

> "The resources of the brain are enormous. It is undoubtedly the most complicated machine ever invented."

> "How much unfulfillment there is in all modern society."

> "[Second-hand bookshops] are like churches in the middle of this stupid civilization."

> "Surely imagination is the greatest power ever discovered by man, greater than oil, electricity, atomic energy."

> "A man can be forgiven for many things, but deserting his wife and baby in the middle of a strange country is not just weakness or even wickedness, but a repulsive kind of selfishness that disgusts me."

In the early part of the novel one begins to suspect – no, to hope – that it is a spoof. This hope is reinforced by such matters as saying that a girl has "some of the loveliest eyes I've ever seen"; by crediting the same quotation, on different pages, to both Blake and Rabelais; by using the film stars Norma Talmadge and Rudolph Valentino as reference-points in this novel set in 1955. Or by having a musician remark, after he plays a Beethoven piece:

> "This sonata presages the end of commerce and all forms of human selfishness. On the day when men turn into gods, they will play Beethoven's Ninth Symphony as a hymn of triumph. But then they will look back on man's long struggle, on the painful road, on the indomitable spirit that drove us on. Then they will play Opus 111 in a mood of reminiscence."

But Wilson certifies that it is not a spoof. He is quoted on the jacket: "The present novel was written because I feel that no one has ever treated sex, from the man's angle, with intelligence as well as frankness. I believe a writer should, as far as he can, tell 'the whole truth' about himself. The book, I hope,

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speaks for itself." It does; and also for hundreds of previous novels.

My only further guess in this matter is that Colin Wilson himself is a spoof: that, say, Kingsley Amis, Malcolm Muggeridge, and Peter Ustinov go away together on occasional week-ends and compose a "Colin Wilson" book – either one of the elaborated anthologies like *The Outsider* or one of the novels that plumb a bright 15-year-old mind. (When they began, obviously, they put a male model under contract to pose for continually maturing jacket photos.) They give their creations just enough writing skill to be readable, just enough flirtation with contemporary ideas to lend them superficial seriousness, but sufficient insipience to make the joke clear before long. Yes, that may well be it. And if this statement provokes a letter from a "real" Colin Wilson, that may only prove to what lengths a good intellectual-artistic prank can be carried.

ART

The Armory Disarmed

The re-examination of the past of modern art has reached its climax with the opening of the reconstituted Armory Show on its 50th Anniversary on the original grounds, the 69th Regiment Armory in New York City. The true meaning of the myth of the Armory Show has also been subject to re-examination; the authenticity of the event's mythic quality may be taken as proved by the mere fact of its continuing reinterpretation to meet changing needs and changing personnel.

Some years ago the crudest form of the myth ran like this: prior to 1913, American art was hopelessly bogged down in an Academic Style supervised by an Academic Establishment. The only opposition to these grim guardians of the past was the quaint and superficial rebellion of the Eight; these newspapermen-turned-artists, it was held, were bright enough to know the Academy was inadequate, not bright enough to know the true way of art. Over this confused struggle on a darkling plain, the Armory Show burst like a sudden sunrise, illuminating the futility of both sides of the American controversy and pointing the way to the promised land of modern art. Thereafter, the myth continued, American artists obligingly began to paint Cubism, Fauvism, Dadaism, Surrealism and all was well in the house of art. Not that there weren't backslidings. During the thirties, many Americans looked backward to the Eight and even to the 19th Century and began lamentably painting not only scenes from the slums but even from the prairies. After World War II, however, historical inevitability triumphed once more and our painting became firmly established as once-for-all unobjective, ensuring "for a thousand years," the course of art charted at the Armory.

By all odds the most delightful variant of this basic myth has been the one that ties it in with the discovery of the American identity. According to this variant, the Armory Show demonstrated that historical American painting had always been European at heart; from the elaborate machines of Benjamin West to the bravura brushwork of George Luks, it was all shamelessly borrowed from prevalent methods in French, German or even – God help us – English academies. The Armory Show, with its revelation of 19th and early 20th Century advanced European styles, helped, but not enough. It was only when our questing youth, in New York, during World War II, were able to be influenced by refugee French Surrealism, Dutch Neo-plasticism and German Dadaism that a true American style could be born. The variant has been varied further and made more useful still by a re-interpretation of the old-time American realism as an unconscious longing for the reality of the materials and gestures of painting; the longing became conscious and was satisfied only when the artist was free to

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
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walk about on his real, supine, canvas and decorate it with real, liquid paint as he passed. Thus, in the working out of the myth through history, the original parties to the Armory Show – European advanced art and naïve American realism – have become one; in the light of recent art world history, it shouldn't be difficult to reconcile the original Devil – the Academy – into the New Synthesis.

That particular reconciliation, in fact, appeared well along at the Armory opening. At $25 a head and all the champagne you could drink (for the benefit of the Henry Street Settlement), the spruced up crowd seemed a far cry from both the Black Revolutionary Gang of Robert Henri and the European dynamite the Gang imported.

The diminishing revolution theme was carried out in the installation, too. From photographs it is clear that the original Show filled up the drill shed. In the reconstituted version, free standing structures occupy only the central area. Large areas around all four sides are occupied with the picture story of 1913 and the Show itself, with the picture story of the Henry Street effort, and with red, white and blue bunting billowed above cafe tables and chairs.

Whatever the social significance of the diminishing, it is not the fault of the Munson-William-Proctor Institute of Utica, which managed the re-assembly. Just under 400 of the original 1300 works have been brought back together, largely as the result of detective work by Joseph S. Trovato. Still, distortion is inevitable when reconstruction depends on chance survival. In the Show as reassembled, the leading American appears to have been Ryder, the leading European, Redon, on the basis of the number of pictures hung. Sculpture gets particularly short shrift in the present version, only Brancusi coming through with anything like what must have been the force of 50 years ago.

The general interpretation of the myth is borne out in the new Show. The European work is generally superior to the American; if you could strike a median in such matters, it would be vastly superior. Yet there are surprises. Matisse comes through as by far the strongest of the 20th Century Europeans. It is a real shock to recall that such major pictures as "The Red Studio" and "Goldfish and Sculpture" were painted early enough to be in the Show. The two Picassos, on the other hand, are readily acceptable as of their period. According to news accounts of the time and according to the myth as developed since, neither Matisse nor Picasso was the most spectacular artist represented in 1913. Picabia seems to have got top individual billing – among other things because he wrote an explanation of Cubism that many found needed explanation itself – while the individual shocker of a painting was Duchamp's celebrated "Nude Descending a Staircase." Seen again, in the flesh and in the context, paintings of neither man seem remarkable in any way. The Duchamp "Nude" is a purely intellectual application of the idea of Cubism. It explains itself as readily as any representation and offers the same low-level rewards. Low-level or not, the reward of Duchamp's famous painting, like those of more conventional representation, are real enough.

The American section, too, has its weak imitations, more of them, in fact, and the things imitated seem now much less worthy of imitation. Yet there is life even among the Americans. In terms of influence, it is absurd to compare Maurice Prendergast with Matisse; but influence aside, it is Prendergast who strikes the eye at the Armory now in basically the way Matisse does. The paintings are bright, bold and fresh. Because of costume and setting, they are of their period, but they lift their props out of period entirely; in the same way they redeem the jewel-like tones that could so easily remind you only of the end-of-the-age.

Prendergast stands out in the Show because his pictures hang together in utter and justified confidence; he has already become what he was to be and what he was was sufficient. The paintings by Sheeler, in contrast, surprise because Sheeler was to become much more; the same is true of Stuart Davis. In different ways, both have transformed Cubism into a skillful instrument for peculiarly American purposes; neither had begun to do so in the pictures at the Armory.

John Marin's highly personal abstraction still convinces and reveals less relation than ever to the main currents of

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the New Art from Paris. But the greatest distance from the new aesthetic may be seen in John Sloan's "Sunday, Women Drying their Hair," and in Edward Hopper's "Sailing." Both pictures come pretty close to the top of their creators' work, the Sloan more than the Hopper. Both are oblivious to anything but the existence of some hidden truth within appearances. Both artists had decades before them, decades in which they could continue to labor in patience at freeing the truth hidden in the American surfaces of their world. Were they misguided?

The Armory Anniversary has seen once more the expression of amazement that men who painted like Davies and Kuhn could nevertheless appreciate Matisse and Picasso. Perhaps there is an obligation for us, to whom Cubists and Fauves come so easily, to look once more at the American realism the practitioners of which brought French art to the Armory in the first place. As a continuation of the spirit of the Eight's exhibition in '08, the Armory Show was certainly hoped by its organizers to open American doors to American realist painting. Perhaps the nicest thing about the anniversary is that the last few years have seen American acceptance accorded Kuhn and Prendergast and others of their tradition as it has so long been given the Europeans they introduced us to.

FRANK GETLEIN

Advance

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Corke and "The Two Cultures"

Sirs:

No responsible critic could, like your reviewer of *Two Cultures? The Significance of C. P. Snow* (April 13), have devoted his entire review to Dr. Leavis' ungentlemanly tone, and the imagined psychological reasons for it, without even trying to define the profoundly important social issue between Leavis and Snow. The issue between them is no less than the kind of human society we should seek to build for the future. Snow's lecture, *The Two Cultures and the Young Scientific Revolution*, had a theme which, to your reviewer, though unimpressive in thought or expression, was "at least meritorious," and, if acted on, "would culminate in effects that would be, if marginally, more useful than not."

Of course, if it has meaning, it is "meritorious" to propose that we bring together "the two polar groups" into which "The intellectual life of the whole Western society is being split." But Snow implies more: it is the scientists who "have the future in their bones," and are more socially responsible; but it is the representatives of "traditional culture" that still hold the positions of power in government and education. Snow suggests that the world needs scientists in these positions, for only the scientific culture can take the transformations in the modern world in its stride. "Yet when we don't take it in our stride it makes us look silly." Dr. Leavis thinks that the problems man faces in the modern world are more than technological or political, more than Snow seems even aware of. Leavis values the economic standard of life, but he reminds us of Ruskin's distinction between "wealth and well-being . . . for Ruskin 'well-being' or 'welfare' could not conceivably be matters of merely material standard of living with the advantages of technology and scientific hygiene."

Instead of defining and discussing

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this great issue, your reviewer suggests that "we just sit back and have a quiet, ironic laugh at the spectacle of these two gladiators." The irrelevant, self-regarding humor of your reviewer's title ("The Dog That Didn't Bark") and conclusion ("Good dog, good dog") is insulting to intelligence and deliberately discouraging to thought.

Alexander H. Sackton
University of Texas

Hilary Corke tells us why he does not like Dr. Leavis' essays. But in doing so, he makes several statements not connected with Dr. Leavis' own writing that are very unfair and should be corrected. He suggests that the biographical note in the volume was "evidently also either written or else inspired by himself." He goes on later to attack Dr. Leavis for statements made in that note. The biographical note, like the jacket blurbs, are anonymous. It never occurred to us that it might be attributed to him. The note was written for us, at our request, without the knowledge of Dr. Leavis. We felt that the American reader would not be familiar with its contents, and indeed Mr. Corke uses in his review some of the material which we provided. Mr. Corke goes on to attack comments which we made in the blurb, misunderstanding some of the irony which we had intended. Criticizing blurbs is fair play, and we cannot possibly object to that. If Mr. Corke thinks that Dr. Leavis' American publishers think too highly of him, let him say so.

Andre Schiffrin
Pantheon Books

What We See on Television

Sirs:

Paul Goodman's account of TV censorship ("Non-Commercial Channels," April 13) suggests that while New York may be the pacesetter in some areas, in the realm of important, controversial TV fare, it is one of the provinces. The very thing which New Yorkers were recently denied, Chicagoans were treated to in three large doses. During March, the "Off the Cuff" program, emceed by Norman Ross on WBKB, presented a series of three two-hour discussions on the problems of sex in contemporary society (the first dealt with homosexuality, the second with prostitution and the third with premarital sex and adultery). The discussion was lively and candid and by no means weighted on the side of popular opinion. The program on prostitution even went so far as to include a prostitute, blindfolded, and a pimp. The only timid element was the Chicago Police Department, which turned down an invitation to have one of its representatives appear on that program.

Chicago is fortunate in having not one but three outstanding discussion programs (the other two being "Kup's Show," moderated by Irv Kupcinet, also on WBKB, and "At Random," with Carter Davidson as moderator, on WBBM-TV). All of these have a relaxed, almost non-directive format. I would like to know why Chicago can produce three top discussion programs, free of censorship and a high-pressured format, and New York not even one.

I would like to express my appreciation of Goodman's superb TV reviews. Since they began appearing, *The New Republic* has become must reading.

Harry Zitzler
Chicago, Ill.

With reference to the item "Fewer Commercials" in the April 13 *New Republic*, I would like to call attention to the existence of the League Against Obnoxious TV Commercials, 11A West Cedar Street, Islip, New York. A newly founded group, the League now has 500 members in 21 states, and publishes a monthly newsletter. The League polls its members monthly in order to determine which sponsors to award such commendations as the "first Seal of Obnoxiousness." The League also formally praises deserving sponsors for decency in TV advertising.

Walter Gore
New York, N. Y.

Connecticut's Retraining Program

Sirs:

Frank C. Porter's excellent article ("Retraining's Brave Promise," April 13) does not give an accurate impression of Connecticut's truly impressive job retraining program.

The number of people being retrained is admittedly a small fraction of the state's unemployed workers – though as of last September almost two thou-

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sand had been retrained – but the Connecticut program is unique in that virtually all of the retrainees have jobs in the field in which they have been retrained. This success has been achieved by tailoring retraining to the openings which were known (through the cooperation of the manufacturers) to be available.

If retraining is to be used to supplement fiscal and monetary policy for full employment, greater attention will have to be paid to finding job opportunities and developing means of worker relocation, as well as to the need which Mr. Porter ably describes of expanding retraining into basic education.

Roberta Carey
Storrs, Connecticut

The Death of Trujillo

Sirs:

If you have good reason to believe that Norman Gall's story, "How Trujillo Died," (April 13) is accurate, it is one of the most shocking revelations of US government operations that has ever been published. All readers of the liberal press knew that Trujillo was a thief and a murderer, and no doubt we all breathed a sigh of relief when he was – as we supposed – assassinated by his own countrymen. But not many of us, I am sure, would have subscribed to the suggestion that we go down and murder him ourselves.

The same issue of *The New Republic* contains an account of the CIA's devious tampering in the affairs of Guatemala, as well as references to its attempted invasion of Cuba (usually referred to in the press, with obvious relief, as the Bay of Pigs "fiasco"). How long is the public expected to put up with this alleged "intelligence" agency, which is accountable to nobody, exhibits little or none of the commodity it is named for, not only makes foreign policy but proceeds to carry it out in a series of bloody blunders – and is, in short, all dagger and very little cloak?

Leila Engel
Bloomington, Indiana

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What's Up in China?

Sirs:

In the last few months I have been awakened to the nature of my prejudices and assumptions about countries such as Cuba and, in particular, mainland China. The source of my misconceptions has been the American press. The most that can be said objectively about the picture we in the United States receive of China through the news media is that it is consistent. And the piling of one apparently independent report upon another adds to the illusion that these reports correspond to reality. Consistency and quantity are unfortunately often mistaken for truth. Jacquet-Francillon's article on China (April 20), is filled with unwarranted interpretations of Chinese statements and actions.

Consider the main point of his article, which is a demonstration that, in the future, China intends to regain all the territory she lost as shown on the map on page 19 of the article. What are the indications of this intention on the part of the Chinese? The editorial in the *People's Daily* which Jacquet-Francillon quotes, asks the ambiguous question, "Have they [Russia] realized what the consequences of this [raising the ques-

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tion of the unequal treaties here and now] might be?" Jacquet-Francillon responds, "The Chinese leaders could not have spelled out their viewpoint more clearly." This is obviously absurd.

From a map published in Peking showing dated boundaries of Chinese territory, he draws the conclusion that China plans to re-acquire the lost territories. First, he does not deny the facts expressed on the map. Second, he puts all the emphasis of his interpretation on the part of the statement quoted from the *People's Daily* which names denouncement as one mode of future action on the unequal treaties, but he glides over the parts of this same statement that alternatively suggest ". . . either recognizing . . . revising, or renegotiating them at the appropriate time." He also cynically passes off the quoted statement that ". . . China proposes to solve these problems by means of peaceful settlement." The basis of his cynicism is the Chinese actions in Tibet in 1951 and 1959 and on the India border last year. The Lhasa revolt of 1959, to which he refers, was participated in by about 2 percent of the population of Tibet, and was led by the serf-owners who were naturally trying to preserve the feudal system. We are always told what China did *to* the serf-owners but never what they are doing *for* the peasants. Social reform there has been immense. (See for example Edgar Snow's *The Other Side of the River* or Felix Greene's *Awakened China*.) As for the India border dispute, how many people are aware of the Chinese request for peaceful negotiations for some months previous to the battling, or that, in fact, it was Nehru who ordered the first attack and the Chinese response was more than he bargained for? (See for example *Monthly Review*, January 1963 or *New York Times*, October 14, 1962.) On the other hand, he admits that China settled borders peaceably with Nepal, Burma, and Pakistan. These facts, plus the admitted good relations with both North Korea and North Viet Nam, tend to support rather than belie the Chinese government's statement of peaceful intentions.

Unless one builds a framework into which he can fit these facts objectively, he accepts only one side of the story and automatically rejects the other, while he should be treating both sides with a healthy skepticism. Books such as Victor Purcell's *China*, Tibor Mende's *China and Her Shadow*, G. S. Gale's *No Flies in China*, plus the two mentioned above are very helpful in restoring equilibrium. I emphasize that this is not a plea for wholesale acceptance of the other side of the issue, but simply for an awareness of it.

William M. Sacks
Cambridge, Mass.

Correction

In a recent lead note ("The Race to the Moon," *NR*, April 13) it was said that "a US rocket has yet to hit the moon . . ." That statement was incorrect. All but one US Ranger shots missed completely, but one did plow into the moon many hours after its radios went dead, making its value almost nil.

THE EDITORS

The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster

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